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Sentence for the Damned: Using Atkins 
to Understand the “Irreparable 
Corruption” Standard for Juvenile Life 
Without Parole  
Zachary Crawford-Pechukas* 
The sad truth is that most evil is done by people who 
never make up their minds to be good or evil.1 
Table of Contents 
 I. Introduction .................................................................... 2148 
 II. Background of the Issues Surrounding Criminal 
  Culpability and Juveniles .............................................. 2154 
  A. Life Without Parole ................................................. 2154 
  B. Harsher Treatment of Juveniles ............................. 2160 
  C. Brain Science and Scientific Development Impacts on 
   Sentencing ................................................................ 2165 
 III. Creation and Development of the Irreparable  
  Corruption Standard ...................................................... 2169 
  A. The Road to Miller and Montgomery ...................... 2170 
  B. Miller, Montgomery, and the Irreparable Corruption 
   Standard ................................................................... 2176 
  C. The Difficult Application of the Irreparable  
   Corruption Standard ............................................... 2181 
                                                                                                     
 * Candidate for J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law. I 
would like to thank J.D. King, who guided me through this process, and Jacob 
Howard, whose work on this issue contributed to this Note. I would like to 
acknowledge Kia Stewart and George Toca, whose cases inspired my interest in 
this subject and whose strength and grace continue to inspire me; my mother, my 
life-long sounding board; and my late father, whose green pen editing was missed 
in this process though not nearly as much as he is. 
 1. HANNAH ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND: THE GROUNDBREAKING 
INVESTIGATION ON HOW WE THINK 180 (1981). 
2148 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2147 (2018) 
   1. Scientific Difficulties .......................................... 2182 
   2. Procedural Difficulties in the States ................. 2184 
 IV. The Link between Life Without Parole and Death  
  Penalty Jurisprudence ................................................... 2191 
 V. Applying the Lessons of Death Penalty  
  Jurisprudence ................................................................. 2193 
  A. Looking to the Atkins Line of Cases for  
   Guidance on Defining an Amorphous Standard .... 2194 
  B. Applying the Lessons of Atkins ............................... 2202 
 VI. Conclusion ...................................................................... 2206 
I. Introduction 
In 1924, two teenagers, Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb, 
stood trial in Chicago for the “crime of the century.”2 The two boys 
were accused of randomly selecting, kidnapping, and brutally 
murdering a neighborhood boy, fourteen-year-old Bobby Franks, as 
he walked home from school and then leaving his naked body in a 
culvert.3 Both boys confessed to the murder and displayed no 
remorse.4 Asked their motive, the boys replied that it was “an 
experiment in sensation.”5 
Facing the death penalty, the boys, represented by famous 
“attorney for the damned” Clarence Darrow,6 pleaded guilty to avoid 
the judgment of a jury.7 This put the decision as to whether they 
should live or die in the hands of the judge.8 Such a sentencing 
hearing would be otherwise unremarkable except for two important 
                                                                                                     
 2. See David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, “Owing to the Extreme 
Youth of the Accused”: The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 702–04 (2002) (providing a synopsis of the crime). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 702 n.245. 
 6. For more information on Darrow, see JOHN A. FARRELL, CLARENCE 
DARROW: ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED (2011); ANDREW E. KERSTEN, CLARENCE 
DARROW: AMERICAN ICONOCLAST (2011). 
 7. Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 2, at 702. 
 8. Id. 
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things weighing on the judge’s decision: (1) who these boys were and 
(2) a bevy of psychological testimony put on by the defense to 
persuade the judge to let the two boys live.9 
Leopold and Loeb were the sons of Hyde Park millionaires and, 
though still teenagers, graduates of elite universities.10 At the time 
of the murder, Leopold was already a published ornithographer and 
had qualified to enter Harvard Law School.11 Loeb was the youngest 
ever graduate of the University of Michigan.12 In their defense, 
Darrow put on psychiatrists and experts on juvenile delinquency to 
explain the boys’ behavior.13 In his final plea, Darrow invoked the 
change in attitudes towards juvenile offenders that saw Chicago at 
the center of a movement to treat — instead of punish — child 
offenders.14 Darrow warned that sentencing these teenagers to 
death would be “turning our faces backward toward the barbarism 
which once possessed the world” and prophesized, in summation, 
that 
Someday, if there is any such thing as progress in the world, if 
there is any spirit of humanity that is working in the hearts of 
men, someday men would look back upon this as a barbarous age 
which deliberately set itself in the way of progress, humanity, 
and sympathy, and committed an unforgivable act.15 
Leopold and Loeb were spared and sentenced to life in 
prison.16 While in prison, Leopold and Loeb founded and ran the 
                                                                                                     
 9. See id. at 703 (noting the degree to which the testimony of these “men of 
science” attracted international attention to the case and an invitation to 
Sigmund Freud to psychoanalyze the defendants). 
 10. See Paula S. Fass, Making and Remaking an Event: The Leopold and 
Loeb Case in American Culture, 80 J. AM. HIST. 919, 922 (1993) (profiling the 
defendants). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 2, at 703. 
 14. See MAUREEN MCKERNAN, THE AMAZING CRIME AND TRIAL OF LEOPOLD 
AND LOEB 186 – 87 (1957) (“You would be dealing a staggering blow to all that has 
been done in the city of Chicago in the last twenty years for the protection of 
infancy and childhood and youth.”); see also infra Part II.B (discussing the 
juvenile reform movement of the early twentieth century and its origins in 
Chicago). 
 15. MCKERNAN, supra note 14, at 231. 
 16. Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 2, at 704. 
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Statesville Correspondence School for prisoners.17 Leopold learned 
twelve languages, reclassified the prison library, became an x-ray 
technician, registered inmates for the draft during World War II, 
volunteered for a medical project to cure malaria, and wrote an 
autobiography.18 After thirty-three years, he was paroled, married, 
worked in a hospital, taught at the University of Puerto Rico, 
researched leprosy, and upon his death willed his body to science.19  
Eighty years after the sensationalized case of the 
“boy-murderers,” the United States Supreme Court held in Roper 
v. Simmons20 that courts could not sentence juveniles to death.21 
Darrow’s prophecy came true as a result of developments in brain 
science, which enabled the Supreme Court to conclude that the 
developing adolescent brain may result in an individual’s 
diminished personal culpability for crimes he commits.22 This 
diminished culpability required the Court to reassess the 
proportionality of some criminal sanctions when imposed upon 
children and the intellectually disabled.23 
Alongside these developments, however, two new phenomena 
emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century, which called 
into question whether this moment could truly be called progress. 
There was both a shift towards longer and more severe 
punishments in criminal sentencing at large and a concomitant 
hardening in attitudes towards juvenile justice—from a focus on 
rehabilitation of youthful offenders to a focus on punishment.24 
Life without parole went from being an unused, or misnamed,25 
                                                                                                     
 17. Id. Richard Loeb was murdered in prison in 1936, twelve years into his 
sentence. Id.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. at 704–05. 
 20. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 21. See id. at 568 (holding that the imposition of the death penalty on 
juvenile offenders under eighteen constituted “cruel and unusual punishment” 
barred by the Eighth Amendment). 
 22. See infra Part II.C (discussing the brain science developments of the late 
twentieth century).  
 23. See infra Part III.A – B (discussing the development of the Supreme 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence into the realm of juvenile culpability). 
 24. Infra Part II.A – B. 
 25. See infra Part II. A (discussing how parole eligibility made life sentences 
“life” in name only). 
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punishment to being on the books in every state but Alaska.26 And, 
in response to the appearance of a juvenile crime wave, more and 
more teenagers were being sentenced to die in prison.27 
With these forces at play, the Supreme Court intervened in 
Miller v. Alabama,28 holding that the Eighth Amendment’s 
protection of juveniles due to their diminished culpability not only 
barred states from sentencing juveniles to death but also from 
sentencing juveniles to life without parole without considering the 
mitigating circumstances of youth.29 In doing so, the Court stopped 
shy of announcing an all-out constitutional protection for juveniles, 
instead distinguishing between those whose crime “reflects 
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile 
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”30 Those 
juvenile offenders meeting this irreparable corruption standard 
could still be sentenced to the harshest available penalty—life 
without parole.31  
But what does irreparable corruption mean? And how are 
state courts to determine whether an offender, still an adolescent, 
meets this standard of irreparable corruption? Would Nathan 
Leopold have been considered irreparably corrupt when assessed 
at the time, in spite of what we know about his life after he was 
                                                                                                     
 26. See infra Part II.A (reviewing the expansion of life without parole as a 
sentencing option following the moratorium on the death penalty in the early 
1970s). 
 27. See infra Part II.B (discussing the superpredator theory and the 
explosion of juvenile life without parole sentences). 
 28. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).  
 29. See id. at 479 (forbidding a mandatory sentencing scheme, which by its 
nature makes the youth of the offender “irrelevant to imposition of that harshest 
prison sentence”). 
 30. Id. at 479 – 80 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)). 
 31. See id. at 480 (“[W]e do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that 
judgment in homicide cases.”); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 
734 (2016) (clarifying that Miller did more than simply require consideration of a 
juvenile offender’s youth, it “rendered life without parole an unconstitutional 
penalty for a class of defendants,” those who were not irreparably corrupt). 
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paroled?32 Because of federalism concerns, the Supreme Court has 
largely left these questions to the states to determine.33 
This Note suggests that guidance should be drawn from the 
Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence regarding the 
execution of intellectually disabled offenders. Atkins v. Virginia34 
paved the way for the juvenile sentencing cases as the Supreme 
Court for the first time found that, under the Eighth Amendment, 
a selected class of offenders—the intellectually disabled — were not 
eligible for the state’s harshest penalty—the death penalty—
because of their diminished culpability.35 Atkins similarly left the 
state courts to figure out how to decide whether an individual 
offender met this amorphous standard, “intellectually disabled.”36 
As state courts grappled with this standard and failed to 
adequately define “intellectually disabled,” the Supreme Court 
was forced to provide guidance.37 That guidance, in essence, was to 
follow the science to determine who was intellectually disabled.38 
State courts should do the same in developing procedures for 
                                                                                                     
 32. Leopold was nineteen and, therefore, he would not have been affected by 
the rulings in Miller or Montgomery, but, because adolescent brain research now 
shows that brain development continues into a person’s twenties, Leopold can still 
serve as an example. See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 2, at 702 (providing 
Leopold’s age); BARBARA STRAUCH, THE PRIMAL TEEN: WHAT THE NEW DISCOVERIES 
ABOUT THE TEENAGE BRAIN TELL US ABOUT OUR KIDS 204 (2003) (describing 
adolescent brain development extending past the teenage years). 
 33. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735 (explaining how the Court’s concerns 
for federalism limits the degree to which it will impose procedural requirements 
on the states in determining how to carry out the sovereign administration of 
their criminal justice systems).  
 34. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 35. See id. at 321 (concluding that death is not a suitable punishment for an 
intellectually disabled offender because it would not serve the deterrent or 
retributive purposes of the death penalty). 
 36. Id. at 317. 
 37. See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 721 (2014) (rejecting Florida’s 
procedure for determining if an individual is intellectually disabled); Moore v. 
Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017) (rejecting Texas’s procedure). 
 38.  See Hall, 572 U.S. at 721 (“The legal determination of intellectual 
disability is distinct from a medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical 
community’s diagnostic framework. Atkins itself points to the diagnostic criteria 
employed by psychiatric professionals.”); Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044 (“As we 
instructed in Hall, adjudications of intellectual disability should be ‘informed by 
the views of medical experts.’ That instruction cannot sensibly be read to give 
courts leave to diminish the force of the medical community’s consensus.”) 
(citations omitted). 
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determining who is irreparably corrupt, even if the result is a de 
facto prohibition on sentencing any juvenile offenders to life 
without parole.  
In Part II, this Note will look at the confluence of factors that 
led the Supreme Court to expand its Eighth Amendment scrutiny 
to encompass juvenile life without parole sentences.  
Part III will look at the development of the irreparable 
corruption standard by tracing the line of cases from Roper to 
Montgomery, in which the Supreme Court articulated how the new 
scientific understanding of adolescent development affected what 
penalties states could and could not impose upon juvenile offenders 
under the Eighth Amendment. Part III will then look to the 
difficulties that have arisen in trying to interpret the irreparable 
corruption standard.  
Part IV will make the case for why the courts struggling with 
this standard should look to the Atkins cases for guidance. Part V 
will then address the substantive guidance the Court gave in 
Atkins and how a decade later in Hall and Miller the Supreme 
Court was compelled to step in to correct Florida and Texas’s 
misapplication of the Atkins standard. Part V then argues that 
state courts should apply the guidance from these Atkins 
cases— namely that the states needed to hue closer to the clinical 
guidance in making these determinations—in interpreting the 
irreparable corruption standard. 
Overall, this Note argues that to ensure the state court 
definitions of irreparable corruption do not become untethered 
from their clinical foundation, Montgomery should be read to 
require expert testimony that a juvenile offender is irreparably 
corrupt and among the rare offenders for whom life without parole 
is constitutionally permissible. Courts should require such 
testimony to make a determination, even if presently such 
testimony is not possible to find. 
2154 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2147 (2018) 
II. Background of the Issues Surrounding Criminal Culpability 
and Juveniles 
Beginning with Roper v. Simmons39 in 2005, the Supreme 
Court recognized a constitutional difference between adult and 
juvenile offenders based on juveniles’ diminished culpability.40 
Roper and the line of cases that followed41 reflected a Court 
grappling with how to apply evidence of scientific developments 
into its jurisprudence.42 These cases also highlighted a Court 
grappling with the effects of sentencing schemes designed to keep 
people in jail for longer and from an earlier age.43 
A. Life Without Parole 
While legal scholars tend to focus on the death penalty as the 
distinguishing feature of the American criminal justice system,44 
at least one scholar has argued that another punishment—life 
without parole—presents the most striking distinction.45 In 
                                                                                                     
 39. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 40. See id. at 571 (prohibiting the death penalty for juvenile offenders due in 
part to their diminished culpability). 
 41.  See infra Part III.B (discussing the progression of juvenile culpability 
cases leading to the “irreparable corruption” standard). 
 42. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (discussing the scientific studies that suggest 
juveniles have “a lack of maturity” and an “underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility”); Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain 
Development Inform Public Policy?, 50 CT. REV. 70, 75 (2014) (noting the 
dissenting judges preferred a case-by-case approach to assessing psychological 
maturity). 
 43. See Nick Straley, Miller’s Promise: Re-Evaluating Extreme Criminal 
Sentences for Children, 89 WASH. L. REV. 963, 989 (2014) (suggesting the Miller 
cases reaffirmed the principle, dormant during the extreme sentencing trend of 
the 1980s and 90s, that the law treat children different because they act 
different). 
 44. See, e.g., Moshik Temkin, The Great Divergence: The Death Penalty in 
the United States and the Failure of Abolition in Transatlantic Perspective 1–2 
(Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP15-037, 2015) (detailing the 
“striking divide” between the American criminal justice system and that in 
Europe based on use of the death penalty). 
 45. See Craig S. Lerner, Life Without Parole as a Conflicted Punishment, 48 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1101, 1106 (2013) (suggesting that the American use of life 
without parole sentences is the “most striking evidence” of the divide between 
“European leniency” and “American harshness”). 
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Europe, only four nations even have criminal sanctions 
approximating life without parole46 and the sentence is rarely 
applied.47 In the United States, both the number of states using 
life without parole as a criminal sanction and the number of 
inmates serving life without parole sentences increased 
dramatically during the latter half of the twentieth century.48 
In the early part of the twentieth century, very few American 
jurisdictions imposed life without parole49 and those that did, did 
so only as a replacement for the death penalty.50 Wisconsin, a state 
that replaced the death penalty with life without parole, issued an 
official report, which portrayed the “indescribable horror and 
agony incident to imprisonment for life” and recommended the use 
of fixed term sentences, which, though long, would “leave some 
faint glimmer of hope.”51  
For the most part, those handed a “life” sentence were 
parole-eligible after a relatively short period.52 During the first half 
of the twentieth century, federal prisoners sentenced to life would 
be parole-eligible after fifteen years.53 In 1976, Congress changed 
                                                                                                     
 46. See id. at 1113 (noting that the Netherlands, England and Wales, and 
France have inmates serving life sentences where the only mechanism for relief 
is executive clemency). 
 47. See id. (calculating that there are fewer than one hundred inmates 
serving the equivalent of a life without parole sentence in Europe). 
 48. See Leslie Patrice Wallace, And I Don’t Know Why It is That You Threw 
Your Life Away: Abolishing Life Without Parole, the Supreme Court in Graham v. 
Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope for a Second Chance, 20 B.U. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 39–44 (2010) (detailing and explaining the rise of life without 
parole). 
 49. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW KILLING THE DEATH 
PENALTY CAN REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 95 (2017) (counting only seven states with 
life without parole before 1972). 
 50. See Lerner, supra note 45, at 1115 (explaining that a century ago, life 
without parole was imposed primarily as an alternative to the death penalty). 
 51. See id. (citing a report found in WILLIAM TALLACK, PENOLOGICAL AND 
PREVENTIVE PRINCIPLES 155 (1889)). 
 52. Id.; see also ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: 
THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 3 (2013) (highlighting 
Louisiana’s “10/6 law,” in place from 1926 to the 1970s, that allowed life sentenced 
prisoners to be released after a little over a decade if they demonstrated good 
behavior). 
 53. See NELLIS, supra note 52, at 3 (“In the federal system, for example, as 
far back as 1913, parole reviews took place after serving 15 years, though 
remaining incarcerated for the rest of one’s life was still possible.”). 
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the laws to allow for parole after serving ten years of a life 
sentence.54 This change led Justice William Brennan to call life 
imprisonment a misnomer in his concurrence in Furman v. 
Georgia,55 the decision imposing a temporary moratorium on 
executions.56 
The Furman decision, in fact, spurred the modern uptick in 
life without parole sentences.57 States reacted to the nationwide 
moratorium on death sentences by turning to life without parole 
sentences to provide deterrence and satisfy community demands 
for proportionate punishment.58 The fervor for life without parole 
as a sentencing option did not diminish when the Court, just four 
years later, sanctioned new permissible death penalty schemes.59 
Instead, both law-and-order advocates60 and death penalty 
abolitionists61 rallied broad support behind life without parole 
sentences. For law-and-order advocates, the addition of life 
without parole sentences supplemented use of the death penalty 
as a means to “throw away the key” on violent or incorrigible 
                                                                                                     
 54. Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 
219 (1976) (repealed 1984). 
 55. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 56. See id. at 302 n.54 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that because life 
imprisonment rarely meant life, a mandatory life without parole sentence for 
crimes committed while incarcerated would serve as a deterrent). 
 57. See GARRETT, supra note 49, at 96 
[T]he same backlash that brought the death penalty back to life led to 
a surge in states adopting [life without parole]. Some states . . . did so 
in direct response to Furman. Others, acting in the 1980s, did so in 
direct response to new skepticism at the possibility of rehabilitation 
and to a rise in “tough on crime” attitudes generally. 
 58. See id. at 97 (explaining that states considered life without parole as 
providing “all the benefits of the death penalty but without the executions”). 
 59. See id. at 96 (describing the continued increase of life without parole 
statutes during the 1980s and beyond). 
 60. See id. (articulating the cause of “tough on crime” individuals to 
implement life without parole because of the impossibility of rehabilitation). 
 61. See Lerner, supra note 45, at 1116 (explaining that abolitionists believed 
the public would be more likely to support death penalty repeal and juries would 
be more likely to vote against death sentences if life without parole existed as an 
option). 
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offenders.62 Abolitionists, on the other hand, approved of the option 
as a means of discouraging death penalty verdicts.63 
The result was a wide-spread incorporation of life without 
parole sentencing into criminal sentencing codes.64 By 1990, 
thirty-three states and the District of Columbia had adopted life 
without parole.65 By 2012, every state except Alaska had adopted 
life without parole for some crimes, and six states and the federal 
government had eliminated parole altogether.66 
With the death penalty moratorium and the rapid advance of 
life without parole sentences, the Supreme Court toyed with 
applying Eighth Amendment scrutiny to life without parole.67 In 
Solem v. Helm,68 the Court affirmed the reversal of the life without 
parole sentence of a defendant whose six non-violent offenses over 
a fifteen year period69 made him eligible to serve life without parole 
as a habitual offender.70Although the trial court found Helm 
“beyond rehabilitation,”71 there was significant evidence that his 
crimes stemmed from alcoholism.72 The Court, drawing on the 
Eighth Amendment analysis usually reserved for death penalty 
                                                                                                     
 62. See GARRETT, supra note 49, at 98 (questioning whether Texas, the last 
state to adopt life without parole, saw it as a “powerful supplement” to deal with 
juveniles and the intellectually disabled, whom the Supreme Court had recently 
said could not be sentenced to death). 
 63. See id. at 97 (citing public opinion polls and studies of capital juries as 
suggesting that the availability of life without parole discourages jurors from 
selecting death). 
 64. See id. at 96 (describing the steady increase of states with life without 
parole statutes). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267–68 (1974) (rejecting a challenge to 
the constitutionality of a life without parole sentence for a death sentenced 
prisoner whose sentence was later commuted on the condition he never be granted 
release). 
 68. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 69. See id. at 279–81 (recounting Helm’s convictions for three third-degree 
burglaries, one obtaining money under false pretenses, and a DUI before his final 
offense—uttering a “no account” check for $100). 
 70. Id. at 284; see also id. at 281 (reciting the recidivist statute for South 
Dakota as authorizing a maximum penalty of life without parole for a defendant 
charged with a felony and who has at least three prior convictions). 
 71. Id. at 282–83. 
 72. See id. at 297 n.22 (rejecting the suggestion that Helm was a professional 
criminal, rather than an alcoholic who struggled to maintain employment). 
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cases,73 found the sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate.74 
Whatever opening this provided to challenge life without parole 
sentences under the Eighth Amendment was swiftly closed.75 In 
Harmelin v. Michigan,76 the Court, reviewing a mandatory life 
without parole sentence for drug possession, effectively eliminated 
the distinction between life without parole and other life 
sentences.77 There would be no separate category for life without 
parole sentences.78 Courts would not be required to make 
individualized sentencing determinations to ensure the sentence 
was not disproportionate, as they were with death penalty 
sentencing.79 In practice, this cut off Eighth Amendment review of 
life without parole sentences because states could reserve life 
without parole for violent crimes and drug offenses,80 and courts 
could sentence habitual nonviolent offenders to “virtual life” term 
of years sentences that stretched well beyond an offender’s life 
expectancy.81 
                                                                                                     
 73. See id. at 292  
In sum, a court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth 
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the 
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the 
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and 
(iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other 
jurisdictions. 
 74.  Id. at 303; see also id. at 297 n.22 (“Incarcerating him for life without 
the possibility of parole is unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice 
system in any substantial way.”). 
 75. See Lerner, supra note 45, at 1119 (“Yet if Solem intimated a possible 
movement in a European direction, fraught with qualms and equivocations about 
the harshness of [life without parole], Harmelin v. Michigan, decided just eight 
years later, returned America to its distinctively punitive path.”). 
 76. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
 77. See id. at 996 (“It is true that petitioner’s [life] sentence is unique in that 
it is the second most severe known to the law; but life imprisonment with 
possibility of parole is also unique in that it is the third most severe.”). 
 78. See id. (reasoning that life without parole still allowed for “retroactive 
legislative reduction and executive clemency”). 
 79. See id. at 995 – 96 (rejecting the idea of an “individualized mandatory life 
in prison without parole sentencing doctrine”). 
 80. See id. at 1002 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (distinguishing Helm based on 
the severity of the offense, hinting that the Court could still apply scrutiny to life 
without parole sentences, so long as they were for minor crimes). 
 81. See Lerner, supra note 45, at 1119 (“In theory, this intimated a 
willingness to apply meaningful scrutiny to [life without parole] sentences 
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The inclusion of life without parole as a sentencing option may 
have begun as a response to Furman and the tough-on-crime 
movement of the 1980s and 1990s,82 but its use has not diminished 
to reflect the decline in crime since that period.83 Instead, there are 
now tens of thousands of prisoners for whom death would not have 
been permissible, but this “other death penalty”84 has been 
mandatorily applied.85  
By the time Miller v. Alabama86 was decided in 2012, one in 
nine prisoners—nearly 160,000 people—was serving a life 
sentence.87 Nearly a third of those prisoners were serving life 
without parole, and this number was rising more than life 
sentences with the possibility of parole.88 Approximately 2,500 of 
those serving life without parole were juveniles at the time of the 
offense.89  
That so many juvenile offenders have been swept up in this 
expansion of life without parole sentencing is particularly notable 
                                                                                                     
imposed for minor offenses. In practice, however, this qualification proved easy to 
satisfy.”). 
 82.  See GARRETT, supra note 49, at 170 (attributing the surge in the number 
of states with life without parole to a combination of states seeking “whole life” 
alternatives in response to the moratorium on death sentences in the 1970s and 
then tough on crime sentencing measures in the following decades). 
 83. See NELLIS, supra note 52, at 15 (charting the decline in overall prison 
populations versus the increase in parole ineligible lifers in Michigan, New York, 
and New Jersey from 2000 to 2010). 
 84. See GARRETT, supra note 49, at 170 (using the terminology of capital 
punishment in referring to the creation of “life rows,” vastly larger than any death 
row, where prisoners are similarly fated to die on prison grounds); see also id. at 
172 (quoting Ashley Nellis, the author of a 2017 study on life without parole 
sentences, as saying, “Life in prison is a death sentence, without the execution”); 
Mario M. Cuomo, Editorial, New York State Shouldn’t Kill People, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 17, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/17/opinion/new-york-state-
shouldn-t-kill-people.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2018) (defending his veto of bills to 
reintroduce the death penalty in New York by referring to the alternative, life 
without parole, as effectively “a sentence of death in incarceration”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 85. See GARRETT, supra note 49, at 167–86 (discussing the relationship 
between this boom in life without parole sentencing and the decline in death 
sentencing). 
 86. 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
 87. NELLIS, supra note 52, at 1.  
 88. See id. (observing a 22.2% increase in life without parole sentences since 
2008). 
 89. Id. at 11. 
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because of the length of time these offenders will spend 
incarcerated.90 It is also notable because it cuts against the 
criminal justice system’s general desire to treat children offenders 
differently.91 In order for juvenile offenders to face mandatory life 
without parole sentences, prosecutors had to first make a 
threshold decision that those children should in fact be tried as 
adults. As the next section shows, the American criminal justice 
system’s treatment of juvenile offenders evolved in such a manner 
to bring about the Supreme Court’s intervention. 
B. Harsher Treatment of Juveniles 
The second force leading to the Miller/Montgomery line of 
cases was the shift in attitude towards the justice system’s 
treatment of juvenile offenders.92 During the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries, there was a “revolution” in the states’ 
attitudes towards juvenile offenders: “Our common criminal law 
did not differentiate between the adult and the minor who had 
reached the age of criminal responsibility . . . .”93 Julian Mack, 
writing in the Harvard Law Review, lamented that the focus on 
inflicting a punishment proportional to the crime rather than 
reforming the juvenile offender “criminalized [youths] by the very 
methods that it used in dealing with them.”94 New reforms, 
however, reflected “the thought that the child who has begun to go 
                                                                                                     
 90. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010) (“[A] juvenile offender will 
on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an 
adult offender.”); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016) (noting the 
petitioner had already served over fifty years for the crime he committed as a 
seventeen-year-old). 
 91. This is evidenced most notably by the entirely separate juvenile justice 
system and the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons to disallow the 
death penalty for juveniles. See AM. BAR ASS’N, THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJp
art1.authcheckdam.pdf (describing the history and changing attitudes toward the 
juvenile justice system); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting the 
juvenile death penalty). 
 92. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 91 (charting this development of the 
juvenile justice system). 
 93. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106 (1909). 
 94. See id. at 106–07 (“[T]he punishment was visited in proportion to the 
degree of wrongdoing evidenced by the single act; not by the needs of the boy, not 
by the needs of the state.”). 
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wrong, who is incorrigible, who has broken a law or an ordinance, 
is to be taken in hand by the state, not as an enemy but as a 
protector, as the ultimate guardian.”95 In 1899, the first juvenile 
court — providing juveniles with court proceedings separated from 
adult offenders — opened in Cook County, Illinois.96 By 1945 there 
were juvenile courts in every state.97 
Alongside this push to separate juvenile and adult justice 
systems was a move to increase the age of criminal responsibility.98 
Recognizing, presciently, that adolescence extends through age 
twenty-five, Arthur Towne, the Superintendent of the Brooklyn 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, argued that 
treating sixteen-year-olds as possessing the reasoning capabilities 
of adults “flies in the face of present-day psychology and the hard 
facts.”99 In the 1960s, the Supreme Court legitimized the juvenile 
system by guaranteeing that due process protections extended to 
juvenile courts.100 The first half of the twentieth century, thus, 
reflected what Clifford Simonsen and Marshall Gordon, referred to 
as slow movement “away from an age of reform and punishment to 
an age of rehabilitation and understanding.”101 Even outside of the 
corrective focus of juvenile courts, there was a renewed focus in 
preventing juvenile delinquency through intervention, providing 
at-risk youths with opportunities to upgrade their educations and 
learn a skill or trade.102 This prevention focus was reflected in the 
1960’s in the creation of the Jobs Corp. under the Federal Poverty 
                                                                                                     
 95. Id. 
 96. See CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN & MARSHALL S. GORDON, III, JUVENILE JUSTICE 
IN AMERICA 27 (2d ed. 1982) (detailing the origins of the juvenile court system). 
 97. Id.  
 98. See Arthur W. Towne, Shall the Age Jurisdiction of Juvenile Courts be 
Increased?, 10 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493, 501 (1920) (advocating 
for an increased age of criminal responsibility for juvenile offenders). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967) (recognizing that the basic 
constitutional rights of a criminal defendant, such as the right to counsel and 
notice of charges, are extended to juvenile defendants in juvenile court). 
 101. SIMONSEN & GORDON, supra note 96, at 29. 
 102. See id. at 38 (explaining the desire to intervene early with at-risk youths 
by providing skills and job training). 
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Program.103 However, by 1979, Simonsen and Gordon observed 
attitudes swinging back towards a focus on punishment.104  
In 1978, in response to the light sentencing of a 
fifteen-year-old convicted of murder, New York introduced the 
automatic transfer law, allowing children as young as thirteen to 
be tried as adults for murder.105 Between 1990 and 1996, forty 
states had passed similar laws allowing for juveniles to be 
prosecuted as adults.106 An uptick in violent crime in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, including a notable increase in juvenile 
homicides, compounded this change in attitudes.107 The national 
homicide rate increased from 7.9 per 100,000 U.S. residents in 
1984 to an all-time peak of 9.8 per 100,000 U.S. residents in 
1991.108 Over nearly the same period, the homicide rate for 
juveniles nearly tripled.109 
This crime increase led to hysteria over the rise of the “juvenile 
superpredators”110—“kids who have no respect for human life and 
                                                                                                     
 103. See id. (noting that though the main goal of these programs was to 
provide youths opportunities, there was a secondary goal in preventing 
delinquency). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Katie Rose Quandt, Why Does the U.S. Sentence Children to Life in 
Prison?, JSTOR DAILY (Jan. 31, 2018), https://daily.jstor.org/u-s-sentence-
children-life-prison/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (articulating New York’s automatic 
transfer law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 106. See id. (highlighting additional laws, such as those to open juvenile 
records, set mandatory minimum sentences, and replace phrases like 
“rehabilitation” and “best interests of the child” with “punishment” and 
“protection of the public”).  
 107. See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 2, at 642 (explaining how the 
increase in the juvenile homicide rate led academics, such as John Dilulio, to 
predict “a coming tidal wave of remorseless and morally impoverished youth,” the 
so-called “juvenile superpredator”).  
 108.  ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS., U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008 2 (2011). 
 109. Id. at 4. 
 110. For more information on the origin of the term superpredators and a 
discussion of the racial undertones, see Kevin Drum, A Very Brief History of 
Super-Predators, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 3, 2016, 5:04 PM), 
https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2016/03/very-brief-history-super-
predators/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator Fear’, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-bus-recalls-
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no sense of the future . . . [who] kill or maim on impulse, without 
any intelligible motive.”111 Though the superpredator theory would 
later be disproved as a myth,112 it created a heated and fearful 
rhetorical climate that changed the attitude towards juvenile 
offenders as a whole.113 This climate spurred legislative efforts to 
transfer more juveniles into the adult criminal justice system.114 
The new transfer laws differed from past efforts in that they gave 
prosecutors or the legislature, not judges, the power to decide 
whether a juvenile should face “adult time for an adult crime.”115 
Second, for crimes such as murder, there was no bottom age limit 
on those who could be transferred and tried as adults.116 The result 
was a large number of juveniles under eighteen-years-old — a 1999 
study suggested the number could be 200,000 each year — being 
tried as adults for a variety of crimes.117  
                                                                                                     
superpredator-threat-of-90s.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 111. See John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WEEKLY 
STANDARD (Nov. 27, 1995, 12:00AM), https://www.weeklystandard.com/john-j-
dilulio-jr/the-coming-of-the-super-predators (last visited Dec. 10, 2018) (“[A]s long 
as their youthful energies hold out, they will do what comes ‘naturally’: murder, 
rape, rob, assault, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, and get high.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 112. See YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 5 (2001) 
(finding “there is no evidence that the young people involved in violence during 
the peak years of the early 1990s were more frequent or more vicious offenders 
than youth in earlier years”); see also Brief of Jeffery Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners at 37, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (No. 
10-9647), 2012 WL 174240 (summarizing data showing Dilulio’s predictions of 
continued increases in juvenile crime were wrong and signed by Dilulio himself). 
 113. See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 2, at 642 – 43 (recounting the 
alarmist rhetoric used to attack the juvenile court system in light of the 
superpredator crisis). 
 114. See Robert J. Smith & Zoe Robinson, Constitutional Liberty and the 
Progression of Punishment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 413, 486 (2017) (“This 
super-predator rhetoric significantly contributed to sharp increases in life 
without parole sentences for juveniles, as well as the transfer of cases from 
juvenile to adult court.”). 
 115. See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 2, at 665 – 66 (distinguishing the 
1990s revolution in transfer laws from the former system of juvenile transfer 
which had been reserved for recidivists or those who committed especially heinous 
crimes). 
 116. See id. at 666, n.99 (citing twenty-three states with provisions placing no 
bottom limit on the age of transferable juvenile offenders for specific crimes). 
 117. See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST., 
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 106 (1999) (including 
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The approach lent itself to an oft-recited appeal for “adult time 
for adult crimes.”118 David Tanenhaus and Steven Drizin point out 
that, through the abolition of parole and the institution of 
mandatory minimum sentencing, by the mid-1990s “youth had 
ceased to be a mitigating factor in adult court and instead had 
become a liability.”119 Juvenile transfers convicted of murder, on 
average, received longer sentences than their adult 
counterparts.120 
As states moved to recast their treatment of juvenile offenders 
back into the terms of punishment and dispositions based more on 
the offense than the offender, evidence emerged to challenge the 
notion of “super-predators” and open a space for the possibility of 
a new reform movement. Juvenile crime decreased between 1994 
and 2000,121 and in 2001 the U.S. Surgeon General debunked the 
super-predator myth.122 Between 2002 and 2011 there was a 
further 31% drop in juvenile arrests.123  
Empirical studies also showed that the states’ legislative 
changes were not causally responsible for the decline in juvenile 
homicide rates.124 In fact, those states with the greatest decrease 
                                                                                                     
as transfers those transferred under judicial waiver, those statutorily excluded 
from juvenile court because of the nature of the crime, and those under eighteen 
tried in states that set the upper age of juvenile court jurisdiction at fifteen or 
sixteen).  
 118. See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 2, at 664 (referencing the use of this 
mantra in arguing for tougher juvenile transfer laws). 
 119. Id. at 665. 
 120. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 117, at 178 (“On average, the 
maximum prison sentence imposed on transferred juveniles convicted of murder 
in 1994 was 23 years 11 months. This was 2 years and 5 months longer than the 
average maximum prison sentence for adults age 18 or older.”). 
 121. Quandt, supra note 105. 
 122. See YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 112, at 5 (“[T]here is no evidence that 
the young people involved in violence during the peak years of the early 1990s 
were more frequent or more vicious offenders than youth in earlier years.”). 
 123. ASHLEY NELLIS, A RETURN TO JUSTICE: RETHINKING OUR APPROACH TO 
JUVENILES IN THE SYSTEM 71 (2016). 
 124. See RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., NO PLACE FOR KIDS: 
THE CASE FOR REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 26 (2011), 
https://www.juvenile-in-justice.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/NoPlaceForKids.pdf (“[F]rom 1997 to 2007, the states 
that decreased juvenile confinement rates most sharply (40 percent or more) saw 
a slightly greater decline in juvenile violent crime arrest rates than states that 
increased their youth confinement rates.”). 
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in juvenile confinement rates between 1997 and 2007 saw a greater 
decline in juvenile crime rates than the national average.125 
Further, there was no difference in crime rate between those states 
which authorized life without parole versus life with parole 
sentences or those that automatically transferred all juveniles over 
the age of sixteen to adult court versus those that transferred more 
selectively.126 It turned out there was little evidence that the 
prospect of longer sentences had any significant deterrent effect on 
adolescents.127 Thus, at the time the Supreme Court started 
considering these juvenile life without parole cases, the cloud had 
begun to lift and reveal the misconceptions of the superpredator 
era, yet the statutory implications of this draconian approach 
towards juveniles remained in place. 
C. Brain Science and Scientific Development Impacts on 
Sentencing 
The third force leading to Supreme Court’s juvenile life 
without parole jurisprudence was the emergence of adolescent 
brain research. This research supported the theory that for some 
juveniles delinquency is part of adolescence that most will outgrow 
without the strong-handed interventions being legislatively 
prescribed in the 1980s and 90s.128 
Since at least the nineteenth century, reformers had 
attempted to apply scientific explanations to juvenile 
                                                                                                     
 125. See id. (detailing national averages for juvenile crime and confinement). 
 126. See James Alan Fox, Abolish Life Without Parole in Mass., 
CORRECTIONS.COM (Nov. 21, 2011), 
http://www.corrections.com/news/article/29641-abolish-juvenile-life-without-
parole-in-mass- (last visited Dec. 2, 2018) (analyzing the 1996 Massachusetts 
statute that made life without parole mandatory for all juveniles fourteen and 
older convicted of first-degree murder, and showing no subsequent impact on 
juvenile homicide rates) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 127.  See Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can 
Both Be Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 9, 14 (2011) (showing that for 
both adolescents and young adults an increase in the risk of arrest has a greater 
deterrent effect than the threat of longer prison sentences). 
 128. See NELLIS, supra note 123, at 78 (crediting this new research-based 
policy framework with discrediting the earlier theories about juvenile offenders’ 
inclination toward crime).  
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elinquency.129 Jane Addams, the founder of Hull House and 
renowned children’s welfare reformer, subscribed to the 
recapitulation theory,130 the theory that juvenile delinquency is the 
result of forces of good and evil battling for possession of a child’s 
soul.131 Through proper guidance and influence, juveniles could be 
turned into “angels of virtue.”132 A contemporary of Addams, 
William Forbush, pushed a theory that troublesome juveniles were 
stuck in “psychic arrest”—periods of continued tendencies towards 
crime.133 If this period of psychic arrest did not pass, the juvenile 
was “considered locked into a life of crime.”134 These early theories 
lacked empirical verification, and “sound scientific explanations 
for delinquent behavior failed to permeate the institutional 
atmospheres of the day.”135 
During the 1980s and 90s, medical and psychosocial research 
on the development of the adolescent brain began to emerge, which 
would become the basis for reassessing juvenile culpability and 
sentencing.136 Led by Laurence Steinberg, an internationally 
renowned expert on adolescence, the Research Network on 
Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice focused on 
adolescents’ competence, culpability, and capacity for change.137  
In terms of competence—the ability to understand the judicial 
process and meaningfully contribute to one’s own defense—
                                                                                                     
 129. See SIMONSEN & GORDON, supra note 96, at 25–26 (explaining the 
emergence of treatments designed to change human behavior with the 
introduction of social science research). 
 130. See id. at 26 (describing Jane Addams’s support of recapitulation theory). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  
 135. See id. at 26–27 (chronicling how nonscientific attitudes based on 
economic, moral, and political forces slowed the advancement of scientific theories 
on delinquency); ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF 
DELINQUENCY 10 – 11(1969) (“[S]tudies of delinquency in the early 1900s have been 
parochial, inadequately descriptive and show little appreciation of underlying 
political and social conditions.”). 
 136. See NELLIS, supra note 123, at 79 (noting that the development of 
adolescent brain research coincided with increasing criticism of the rehabilitation 
focus of pre-1980s juvenile justice systems). 
 137. See id. (“In particular, researchers examined whether deficits in any or 
all of these should be considered mitigating factors in criminal liability and, by 
extension, in sentencing.”). 
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Steinberg recommended a categorical exclusion of juveniles from 
adult courts.138 Similar to those with serious mental illness or 
intellectual disability, Steinberg suggested that juveniles’ age 
should be considered a preexisting impairment because they were 
more vulnerable to pressures from authority figures, such as police 
and legal counsel.139  
In terms of culpability, research revealed that although a 
teenager’s cognitive abilities may be on par with an adult’s, their 
emotional, cognitive, and psychosocial maturity are still 
developing.140 This, in turn, is the reason adolescents routinely 
disregard the long-term consequences of their action and why they 
are predisposed to take risks and act impulsively.141 
Finally, the research focused on juvenile offenders’ prospects 
for reform. Steinberg and his colleagues found that an adolescent’s 
prospects for reform are greater than for a mature adult.142 In 
rebutting the diagnosis of “juvenile psychopathy,” they concluded 
that antisocial activity in adolescence is not usually indicative of 
bad character — their bad acts tend to be out of character — and 
there is no evidence that juveniles who display characteristics of 
adult psychopaths (i.e. juveniles who are callous, manipulative, 
and antisocial) actually become adult psychopaths.143 
These findings were supported by the findings of 
neuroscientists from Harvard Medical School, the National 
Institute of Mental Health, and UCLA’s School of Medicine, who 
produced analyses of the prefrontal cortex to demonstrate why 
                                                                                                     
 138. See id. at 80 (arguing that typical remedies, such as using medications 
to establish competency, would be ineffective for juveniles). 
 139. Id.  
 140. See id. (discussing research on the comparative culpability of juveniles 
and adults). 
 141. See id. (“This rational balancing of pros and cons does not become a 
regular feature in decision making until adulthood.”). 
 142. See id. (opposing the argument that juveniles are more capable of 
modifying their behavior). 
 143. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of 
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the 
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 1009, 1015 (2003) (“Although the notion 
that some juvenile offenders are actual or ‘fledgling’ psychopaths has become 
increasingly popular in legal and psychological circles, no data exist on the 
stability or continuity of psychopathy between adolescence and adulthood.”).  
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teenagers sometimes act irrationally.144 Comparing MRI scans of 
the prefrontal cortex through time, the researchers detected an 
important “growth spurt” in the brain that begins in 
adolescence.145 The prefrontal cortex, the brain’s primary 
decision-maker, continued developing well into a person’s 
twenties.146 For juveniles, this meant their brains were still 
maturing, and they did not yet possess the physiological abilities 
of adults to control their impulses, exercise judgment, or entirely 
comprehend the consequences of their actions.147 
These scientific findings, thus, revealed a fundamental 
disconnect between what researchers now knew about the 
characteristic features of adolescents and the assumptions of the 
criminal justice system about juveniles.148 While some 
developmental research was available to the Supreme Court when 
it first addressed the juvenile death penalty in 1989,149 these new 
findings would shake the manner in which the Court assessed 
juvenile criminal culpability.150 While the research presented in 
the 1980s suggested that moral development was a long-term 
process that juveniles had not yet completed, it had lacked the 
strength of this neuroscience-backed evidence.151 When the Court 
was called upon to readdress juvenile criminal culpability 
beginning with Roper, relevant organizations of psychiatrists, 
                                                                                                     
 144. See NELLIS, supra note 123, at 81 (detailing the research findings of 
several neuroscientists on juvenile behavior). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A 
DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH 23 – 26 (2012) (recollecting the history of research 
developments as to the heterogeneity of juvenile offending). 
 149. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a death sentence given to a seventeen-year-old offender); see 
also Kevin W. Saunders, The Role of Science in the Supreme Court’s Limitations 
on Juvenile Punishment, 46 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 339, 340 (2013) (“The science did 
not study the physical structure of the relevant regions of the brain, but presented 
conclusions based on examining the behavior of children and asking them 
questions involving moral decision-making.”). 
 150. For a comprehensive analysis of the neuroscience developments between 
Stanford and Roper, see Saunders, supra note 149. 
 151. See id. at 347 (observing that in the juvenile cases from the 1980s, the 
breakdown amongst the judges reflected those who believed the 
observational-based science versus those who did not). 
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psychologists, mental health, and juvenile experts inundated the 
court with amicus briefs urging the Court to consider this new 
research-supported understanding.152 As the discussion of the 
cases in Part III shows, this new scientific evidence was an 
essential component of the Supreme Court’s juvenile decisions 
holding that, in essence, “kids are different.”153 
III. Creation and Development of the Irreparable Corruption 
Standard 
These behind-the-scenes forces put the criminal justice system 
and brain science on a collision course. As the criminal justice 
system treated more and more juvenile offenders as adults, and 
correspondingly deemed more offenders incapable of 
rehabilitation, the scientific developments were showing the 
opposite—children were not only less culpable than adult 
offenders, they were also the most capable of rehabilitation.154 
Despite this new evidence, juvenile reform advocates encountered 
a Supreme Court wary to interfere with the states’ control of their 
criminal justice systems. As the Harmelin decision showed,155 the 
Court was unwilling to listen to Eighth Amendment challenges to 
criminal sentences as being excessive or disproportionate, unless 
the sentence was death.156 Under the banner of “death is different,” 
the Supreme Court had only been willing to strike down capital 
                                                                                                     
 152. See, e.g., Brief for American Psychological Ass’n & the Missouri 
Psychological Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636447; Brief for American Medical 
Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549.  
 153. See NELLIS, supra note 123, at 83 (“This new narrative, rooted in science, 
was critical to the opinions of the Supreme Court in its four juvenile justice 
rulings over the past decade, but the view that ‘kids are different’ has had 
spillover effects to broader juvenile justice reforms as well.”). 
 154. See supra Part II.A–C (discussing the contemporary developments in 
juvenile brain science and criminal sanctioning). 
 155. See supra Part II.A (reviewing the Supreme Court’s aborted efforts to 
analyze the excessiveness or disproportionality of life without parole sentences in 
the 1980s). 
 156. See infra Parts III.B, IV (discussing how Graham marked a significant 
expansion of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis out of the confines 
of capital jurisprudence). 
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verdicts under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.157 Now, 
this confluence of harsher sentencing of juveniles and scientific 
developments questioning that approach led the Court to consider 
expanding its Eighth Amendment review to meet this problem. 
The fix, however, has created further problems for the states, as 
they are left to determine whether juvenile offenders can be 
deemed irreparably corrupt. 
This Part looks at how the Supreme Court utilized its Eighth 
Amendment framework to find the juvenile death penalty 
unconstitutional and then expanded this Eighth Amendment 
analysis to consider whether sentencing juvenile offenders to die 
in prison also constituted cruel and unusual punishment.158 Then, 
this Part will discuss the Court’s decisions in Miller and 
Montgomery, and the creation of the irreparably corrupt standard 
for determining whether juvenile offenders should be sentenced to 
life without parole.159 Finally, this Part will turn to the scientific 
and procedural difficulties that state courts face in trying develop 
the irreparable corruption standard.160 
A. The Road to Miller and Montgomery 
The idea that states must reassess the boundaries of 
punishment is derived from the concept that the Eighth 
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause is an 
evolving standard that must meet the norms and morality of the 
present day.161 The bulk of modern Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence deals with the application of the death penalty.162 
                                                                                                     
 157. See Mary Berkheiser, Death is Not So Different After All: Graham v. 
Florida and the Court’s “Kids are Different” Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 
36 VT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (describing the Court’s categorical approach to the 
Eighth Amendment as “formerly the exclusive province of the death penalty”). 
 158.  Infra Part III.A. 
 159. Infra Part III.B. 
 160. Infra Part III.C. 
  161. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“[T]he [Eighth] Amendment 
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”). 
 162. See Sarah French Russell & Tracy L. Denholtz, Procedures for 
Proportionate Sentences: The Next Wave of Eighth Amendment Noncapital 
Litigation, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1121, 1125 (2016) (pointing out that the Supreme 
Court “rarely invalidated noncapital sentences on Eighth Amendment grounds”). 
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But, as the Supreme Court noted in Coker v. Georgia,163 the Eighth 
Amendment bars not just “barbaric” punishments, but those that 
are excessive in relation to the crime.164  
In assessing whether a punishment categorically runs afoul of 
the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court developed a two-part 
inquiry.165 First, the Court asks whether there is a consensus about 
the acceptableness of the sentence.166 Then, the Court applies its 
own judgement to ask whether the sentence is unconstitutionally 
excessive.167 A punishment can be unconstitutionally excessive in 
one of two ways: (1) it does not contribute to an acceptable goal of 
punishment such as deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, or 
rehabilitation168 or (2) it is grossly disproportionate to the crime.169  
After Gregg, the Supreme Court used this Eighth Amendment 
framework to prohibit the use of the death penalty for certain 
categories of offenders170 and for certain offenses.171 In Roper v. 
Simmons, the Supreme Court utilized its Eighth Amendment 
                                                                                                     
 163. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (summarizing the takeaway from the plurality 
and two concurring opinions in Gregg v. Georgia, the decision reaffirming the use 
of the death penalty). 
 164. See id. (providing the precedent that would guide the Court’s future 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 165. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172–73 (1976) (establishing an 
objective and a subjective component of the Eighth Amendment analysis). 
 166.  See id. at 175–76, 181 (analyzing state legislative activity and juries’ 
sentencing decisions as “significant and reliable objective ind[ices] of 
contemporary values”). 
 167. See id. at 182 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment demands more than that a 
challenged punishment be acceptable to contemporary society. The Court must 
ask whether it comports with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of 
the Amendment.”). 
 168. See id. (elaborating that such a punishment “is nothing more than the 
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering”). 
 169. Id.  
 170. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (barring capital 
punishment for intellectually disabled offenders); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
399, 410 (1986) (barring capital punishment from being inflicted on a prisoner 
who is insane). 
 171. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413, 439 (2008) (barring 
capital punishment for rape of a child or other offenses not resulting in the death 
of the victim); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (barring capital 
punishment for rape of an adult victim). 
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framework to strike down capital punishment for juvenile 
offenders—those under eighteen at the time of the offense.172  
The Court first looked to state legislative action and 
“consistency of the direction of change”173 and the decline in actual 
use of the penalty174 to find that a national consensus had emerged 
against the juvenile death penalty, as thirty states did not impose 
the death penalty on juveniles.175 Next, the Court applied its own 
independent judgment to determine that the juvenile death 
penalty was both disproportionately severe and imposed on a class 
of people with an inherently diminished capacity.176 According to 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion, the death penalty is reserved for a 
narrow category of crimes177 and the worst offenders,178 those 
“whose extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of 
execution.”179  
The Court cited three distinctions between juvenile and adult 
offenders that prevented juveniles from being reliably classified 
among the worst offenders.180 First, juveniles are comparatively 
                                                                                                     
 172. See id. at 578 (holding that the Eighth Amendment 
“forbid[s] . . . imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age 
of 18 when their crimes were committed”). 
 173. See id. at 566 (noting that since its prior decision upholding the death 
penalty for offenders between the ages of sixteen and eighteen, five states had 
abolished their juvenile death penalty); but see id. at 595–96 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (challenging the majority’s consensus by noting the slow pace — only 
five states in fifteen years — and the lack of uniformity of the change—two states, 
Virginia and Missouri, “expressly reaffirmed their support” by enacting statutes 
setting sixteen as the minimum age). 
 174. See id. at 563 (counting only three states that had actually executed 
juveniles in the decade prior). 
 175. Id. at 560.  
 176. Id. at 567–75. 
 177. See id. at 568 (noting the Court’s previous rejection of imposition of the 
death penalty for even severe crimes, such as rape of an adult woman and felony 
murder where the defendant did not attempt to, intend to, or actually kill the 
victim) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 
782 (1982)). 
 178. See id. (“The death penalty may not be imposed on certain classes of 
offenders, such as juveniles under 16, the insane, and the mentally retarded no 
matter how heinous the crime.”).  
 179. Id. at 572.  
 180. See id. at 570–71 (recalling that the Court had relied on these distinct 
characteristics of those under the age of sixteen to find the Eighth Amendment 
prohibited the death penalty for that group). 
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immature and irresponsible.181 Second, juveniles are “more 
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside 
pressures.”182 Third, a juvenile’s personality traits are not set, 
allowing for greater possibility for rehabilitation.183 Because of 
these unique characteristics, the Court concluded that juvenile 
offenders were less culpable for their crimes.184 
In turn, juvenile offenders’ diminished culpability makes the 
recognized justifications for the death penalty—retribution and 
deterrence—inadequate.185 The Court found the retributive 
purpose, as an expression of the community’s moral outrage or 
attempt to avenge the victim, was ill-served where the juvenile 
offender’s immaturity made him less blameworthy.186 Likewise, 
the argument for deterrence fails because juveniles are extremely 
unlikely to have made a cost-benefit analysis that considered the 
possibility of execution.187 Without a valid penological justification, 
imposition of the juvenile death penalty is automatically 
disproportionate and, thus, a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.188 
                                                                                                     
 181. See id. at 569 (relaying “what any parent knows” and what “scientific 
and sociological studies” tend to confirm, children’s immaturity and 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility lead to adolescents being “overrepresented 
statistically in virtually every category of reckless behavior” (quoting Jeffrey 
Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 
DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 339 (1992))).  
 182. See id. at 569–70 (“Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of 
control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim 
than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole 
environment.”). 
 183. See id. (“The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity 
means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by 
a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character . . . for a greater 
possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”). 
 184. Id.  
 185. See id. at 571–72 (“We have held there are two distinct social purposes 
served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by 
prospective offenders.”). 
 186. See id. at 571 (“Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe 
penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to 
a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.”). 
 187. See id. at 572 (reasoning that even if a case could be made for the 
deterrent effect of the juvenile death penalty, the sentence of life without parole 
is “itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person”). 
 188. Id. at 571–72, 575. 
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In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected the argument 
that a categorical ban was an overreach because there may be 
juvenile offenders who commit heinous crimes and possess 
“sufficient psychological maturity.”189 The Court concluded that 
allowing jurors to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the 
juvenile was sufficiently culpable would create an “unacceptable 
likelihood” that the heinous nature of the crime might overpower 
any mitigation based on the youth of the offender.190 The danger 
was that a jury, presented with a juvenile whose immaturity, 
vulnerability, and “lack of true depravity” should warrant a 
sentence less than death, could be so inflamed by the brutality of 
the crime that they might unjustly sentence him to death.191 To 
bolster this argument, the Court pointed out, “It is difficult even 
for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile 
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient 
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
irreparable corruption.”192 The Court declined to encumber jurors 
with a task that trained psychologists, with the benefits of 
diagnostic expertise, clinical testing, and observation, would 
struggle to reliably assess.193 Life without parole, thus, became the 
harshest available penalty for a juvenile offender. 
In 2010, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida194 expanded 
the Eighth Amendment’s reach to strike down the imposition of life 
without parole sentences to juveniles who committed 
“nonhomicide” crimes.195 The Court recognized that life without 
                                                                                                     
 189. See id. at 572 (dismissing petitioner’s argument that the Supreme 
Court’s past insistence on individualized consideration of the mitigating and 
aggravating factors in a death penalty case made the adoption of a categorical bar 
both arbitrary and unnecessary). 
 190. See id. at 573 (pointing out that in Simmons’s case, the prosecutor even 
argued that the defendant’s youth should be treated as an aggravating factor 
because his longevity would make him a danger for longer). 
 191. See id. (suggesting that the brutality of a particular crime may blind a 
jury to any mitigating facts of youth). 
 192. See id. (explaining that psychiatrists are prohibited by the American 
Psychiatric Association from diagnosing juveniles under eighteen as having 
antisocial personality disorder, commonly referred to a psychopathy or 
sociopathy). 
 193. Id.  
 194. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 195. Id. at 53. 
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parole is an “especially harsh punishment for a juvenile” because 
they will, on average, serve more years and a greater percentage 
of their lives in prison than a non-juvenile lifer.196 Accordingly, the 
Court held that the Eighth Amendment required that juveniles 
convicted of non-homicide offenses must be provided a “meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation.”197 
As with Roper, the Court again rejected the idea that juries 
should be allowed to determine if a particular offender might have 
“sufficient psychological maturity” to overcome the Court’s 
concerns.198 Again, the Court reiterated that the differences 
between juvenile and adult offenders are too well understood to 
risk sentencing a juvenile with diminished culpability to life 
without parole.199 
Separately, the Court reasoned that even outside of the death 
penalty context, “[i]t remains true that ‘[f]rom a moral standpoint 
it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those 
of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character 
deficiencies will be reformed.’”200 The Court pointed out that such 
a penalty served no rehabilitative purpose and as such was 
inappropriate in light of the juvenile nonhomicide offender’s 
capacity for change.201  
                                                                                                     
 196. See id. at 70 (noting that a sixteen-year-old and seventy-five-year-old 
each sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name only). 
 197. See id. at 75 (“The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility 
that [offenders] will remain behind bars for life. It does prohibit States from 
making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter 
society.”). 
 198.  See id. (“Categorical rules tend to be imperfect, but one is necessary 
here.”). 
 199. See id. at 69 (finding a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill 
has a “twice diminished culpability”). 
 200. Id. at 68 (second alteration in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 570 (2005)). 
 201. See id. at 74 (noting that those serving life without parole are often 
denied rehabilitative services available to other inmates, further evidencing the 
disproportionality of the sentence when applied to juveniles, who are “most in 
need of and receptive to rehabilitation”). 
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B. Miller, Montgomery, and the Irreparable Corruption Standard 
In 2012, the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama202 extended 
Graham to prohibit the imposition of all mandatory life without 
parole sentences for juvenile offenders.203 Drawing on the brain 
science research cited in Roper and Graham, the Supreme Court 
reiterated that “children are constitutionally different from adults 
for purposes of sentencing.”204 Because of their diminished 
culpability and greater capacity for reform, “imposition of a State’s 
most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as 
though they were not children.”205 The Court used the petitioners’ 
circumstances to illustrate the diminished culpability argument. 
Kuntrell Jackson’s background was so immersed in violence that 
both “his mother and grandmother had previously shot other 
individuals.”206 As for Evan Miller, he had been physically abused 
by his stepfather and neglected by his alcoholic and drug-addicted 
mother to the point that by age fourteen, he had attempted suicide 
four times.207 Mandatory life without parole would, thus, 
“disregard the possibility of rehabilitation even when 
circumstances most suggest it.”208 
However, the Court opted to not issue a categorical ban on the 
imposition of life without parole sentences for juveniles but merely 
found the Eighth Amendment prohibited sentencing schemes 
which made such penalties mandatory.209 The Court reasoned that 
“[m]andatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes 
                                                                                                     
 202. 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012). The Supreme Court consolidated Miller, a case 
on direct appeal, with Jackson v. Hobbs, in which Kuntrell Jackson, who like 
Evan Miller was fourteen at the time his offense was committed, challenged ,on 
post-conviction, his life without parole sentence for felony murder. Id. at 466. 
 203. See id. at 479 (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory 
life without parole sentencing schemes for juveniles, because “[b]y making youth 
(and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison 
sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment”). 
 204. See id. at 471 (reciting from Graham the three major differences between 
juveniles and adults for the purposes of sentencing: immaturity; vulnerability to 
outside pressures and their environments; and chance for reform). 
 205. Id. at 474. 
 206. Id. at 478. 
 207. Id. at 478–79. 
 208. Id. at 478.  
 209. See id. at 479 (finding such schemes pose “too great a risk of 
disproportionate punishment”). 
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consideration of chronological age and its hallmark features—
among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate 
risks and consequences.”210 The Court did opine that such 
sentences should be rare based on the discussion in Roper and 
Graham of juveniles diminished culpability, their capacity for 
change, and the difficulty of “distinguishing at this early age 
between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet 
transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects irreparable corruption.”211 
In the end, the Miller decision carved out a small segment of 
juveniles for whom a life without parole sentence was still 
constitutionally permissible: the rare, irreparably corrupt juvenile 
homicide offender.212 This has become a de facto sentencing 
standard that authorizes a sentencer, whether judge or jury, to 
impose the harsher life without parole sentence only after 
(1) considering the mitigating effects of youth; and (2) making a 
finding of irreparable corruption.213  
This issue resurfaced in Montgomery v. Louisiana214 when the 
Supreme Court was called upon to settle a split between the states 
as to whether Miller applied retroactively to 2,100 inmates who 
had already been convicted as juveniles and sentenced under a 
mandatory sentencing scheme to life without parole.215 In light of 
Miller, Henry Montgomery, a sixty-nine-year-old inmate, 
challenged his continued incarceration on a mandatory sentence of 
life without parole for a crime Montgomery committed in 1963 as 
a seventeen-year-old.216 
                                                                                                     
 210. Id. at 477. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (mandating that 
nonhomicide juvenile offenders may never receive life without parole sentences); 
Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80 (providing that the remaining homicide juvenile 
offenders could only receive life without parole in the rare circumstances where 
the sentencer concludes that the youth is irreparably corrupt). 
 213. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–69 (2005). 
 214. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
 215. See Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, POLICY BRIEF: JUVENILE 
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE (The Sentencing Project, New York, N.Y.), updated August 
2017, at 2 (summarizing Montgomery and its impact). 
 216. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 726 (providing the factual background of 
the case).  
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In order for a newly announced rule to apply retroactively to 
cases with a final disposition, the new rule must be either a new 
substantive rule of constitutional law217 or a new “watershed” 
procedural rule.218 The Court’s review in Montgomery, thus, 
focused on whether the Miller decision, in fact created a new 
substantive rule, which would “place certain criminal laws and 
punishments altogether beyond the State’s power to impose.”219 
The key question was whether Miller required sentencing courts 
to simply consider a juvenile defendant’s age before sentencing him 
or her to life without parole—a procedural modification—or did 
Miller, in fact, dictate that states were constitutionally prohibited 
from imposing the punishment—a substantive rule to be applied 
retroactively.220 
Finding Miller announced a substantive rule to be applied 
retroactively, Justice Kennedy, writing for a narrowly divided 
Court, relied upon his majority opinions in Roper and Graham, 
calling them the “foundation stone for Miller’s analysis.”221 Justice 
Kennedy clarified that Miller imposed not only a procedural 
requirement that the sentencer give individualized consideration 
to the circumstances of youth, but also placed a substantive 
limitation upon juvenile life without parole sentences.222 
                                                                                                     
 217. See id. at 728 (defining a substantive rule as those “forbidding criminal 
punishment of certain primary conduct” and those “prohibiting a certain category 
of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense”).  
 218. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989) (limiting the scope of such 
procedural rules to “those new procedures without which the likelihood of an 
accurate conviction is seriously diminished”); see also Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 
U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (defining watershed rules of criminal procedure as those 
“implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding”). 
 219. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729 (focusing on the substantive rule 
exception to the bar on retroactivity because the procedural change would not 
affect the accuracy of any convictions). 
 220. See id. at 730 (“Even where procedural error has infected a trial, the 
resulting conviction or sentence may still be accurate. . . . [T]he same 
possibility . . . does not exist . . . where the Constitution immunizes the defendant 
from the sentence imposed.”). 
 221. See id. at 732–33 (“Miller took as its starting premise the principle 
established in Roper and Graham that ‘children are constitutionally different 
from adults for the purposes of sentencing.”’ (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471)).  
 222. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (“Miller, then, did more than require 
a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth before imposing life without 
parole; it established that the penological justifications for life without parole 
collapse in light of the ‘distinctive attributes of youth.”). 
SENTENCE FOR THE DAMNED 2179 
Accordingly, Miller prohibited states from imposing the 
punishment, not on all juveniles, but on all children “whose crime 
reflects ‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity.” Because of his 
lessened culpability as a juvenile offender, the Court found 
“prisoners like Montgomery must be given the opportunity to show 
their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption.”223 
The Court gave states the option to avoid resentencing by 
simply permitting parole hearings for the Montgomery 
prisoners.224 In doing so, the Court noted that this approach would 
not burden the states and would maintain the finality of state 
convictions.225However, if a state elected to pursue life without 
parole sentence on resentencing, the Court reiterated that Miller 
placed a ceiling on punishment for the vast majority of juveniles.226 
Only based on a “properly informed finding that a child is the rare 
juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity that 
rehabilitation is impossible” could a sentencer impose a life 
without parole sentence.227 In other words, the question for a 
sentencer was whether the offender’s crimes, committed as a 
juvenile, “reflect transient immaturity” or “irreparable 
corruption.”228 
The Montgomery decision importantly expanded Miller to the 
2,100 inmates who were already serving mandatory life without 
parole sentences at the time Miller was announced.229 But it also 
represented an interpretative expansion of Miller by clarifying 
that Miller was meant as a categorical ban on the imposition of life 
without parole sentences for a class of defendants, not based on a 
clear delineator such as age, but on the basis of an amorphous 
trait: irreparable corruption. In doing so, the Court did not define 
irreparable corruption, except to provide a synonym—
                                                                                                     
 223. Id. at 736. 
 224. Id. By Montgomery prisoners, I refer to those whose convictions that were 
final prior to the Miller decision and for whom Montgomery allowed an avenue for 
relief. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 733. 
 228. See id. at 734 (distinguishing Miller from Roper and Graham because 
Miller actually drew a line between the rare, irreparably corrupt offender and the 
majority of juveniles). 
 229.  Id. at 736. 
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“incorrigible”230—and an equally amorphous antonym—“those 
whose crime reflects transient immaturity.”231 Nor did the Court 
provide the states with any meaningful guidance on how they 
should construct a proceeding, whether on initial sentencing or on 
the resentencing required by Montgomery for those sentenced prior 
to Miller, to determine whether a juvenile offender is irreparably 
corrupt.232 Instead, the Montgomery decision foisted upon the state 
courts the responsibility for interpreting and defining a standard, 
and then setting up a procedure to make individual determinations 
of whether offenders met the standard.233 To complicate matters, 
the irreparable corruption standard being handed over to the 
states to develop was based on the exact distinction, between 
transient immaturity and irreparable corruption, that the Court 
had in the death penalty context determined was too complex for 
jurors because it was “difficult even for expert psychologists” to 
distinguish between the two types of offenders.234 
The confounding standard led Justice Scalia, in dissent, to 
suggest that the majority was being disingenuous by even putting 
this standard to the states. “The majority does not seriously expect 
state and federal collateral-review tribunals to engage in this 
silliness, probing the evidence of ‘incorrigibility’ that existed 
decades ago when defendants were sentenced.”235 Instead, Scalia 
asserted the Court’s true motive was found in its “not-so-subtle 
invitation” to the states that they may avoid this resentencing 
process by granting everyone affected parole eligibility: “This 
whole exercise, this whole distortion of Miller is just a devious way 
                                                                                                     
 230. Id. at 734. 
 231. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). 
 232. Cf. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736–37 (2016) (suggesting 
that the evidence raised by Montgomery of his troubled youth, his achievements 
in prison, and his efforts to mentor younger prisoners could be used to show 
rehabilitation). 
 233. See id. at 735 (“We leave to the States the task of developing appropriate 
ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon their execution of sentences.”). 
 234. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (“If trained psychiatrists with the advantage 
of clinical testing and observation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from 
assessing any juvenile under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we 
conclude that States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver 
condemnation.”). 
 235. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the 
particular problem of attempting to gauge an offender’s irreparableness at the 
time of the crime when that offender has spent years in prison). 
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of eliminating life without parole for juvenile offenders.”236 In 
Scalia’s telling, the Court only stops short of saying so explicitly to 
save face.237 Because the Court had relied upon the availability and 
the severity of life without parole in striking down the juvenile 
death penalty,238 it could not, a mere decade later, declare that 
penalty to also be unconstitutionally disproportionate.239 Instead, 
Justice Scalia posited the irreparable corruption standard as a 
Godfather-like offer from the Court to the states: “Avoid all the 
utterly impossible nonsense we have prescribed by simply 
permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for 
parole.”240 This, however, was clearly not an “offer they couldn’t 
refuse,” as the response of many state legislatures has been to try 
to define irreparable corruption, whatever it may mean.241  
C. The Difficult Application of the Irreparable Corruption 
Standard 
In Roper, the Supreme Court specifically relied on the 
difficulty of distinguishing between children whose crimes reflect 
their transient immaturity and those whose crimes reflect 
irreparable corruption as a justification for finding the juvenile 
death penalty unconstitutional.242 What made the irreparable 
corruption distinction an impermissible standard in death penalty 
cases was that the Court would be asking judges and jurors to 
make a distinction that “is difficult even for expert 
psychologists.”243 However, in Miller and Montgomery, the Court 
                                                                                                     
 236. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744. 
 237. See id. (“The Court might have done that expressly . . . but that would 
have been something of an embarrassment.”). 
 238. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 572 (assuaging concerns about any lost deterrent 
effect of striking down the juvenile death penalty by recognizing that juvenile life 
without parole is itself a particularly severe penalty).  
 239. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“How could the 
majority—in an opinion written by the very author of Roper—now say that 
punishment is also unconstitutional? . . . [T]he Court refuses . . . today, but 
merely makes imposition of that severe sanction a practical impossibility.”). 
 240. Id.  
 241. See infra Part III.C.2 (tracking the states’ responses to the Montgomery 
decision). 
 242. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). 
 243. Id. 
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made this scientifically confounding distinction the threshold for 
applying the harshest penalty available, a penalty banned as 
unconstitutional for juveniles who did not meet this criteria.244 
Thus, making a reliable factual determination about a juvenile 
offender’s character is constitutionally significant, because 
without such a finding a life without parole sentence is cruel and 
unusual punishment.245 
The Supreme Court has given little guidance since 
Montgomery as to what and how a sentencer should determine 
whether on a case-by-case basis an offender’s crime reflects 
irreparable corruption.246 Montgomery made clear that the 
sentencer had to do more than simply consider the mitigating 
effects of youth, they had to make the factual determination that 
the offender was irreparably corrupt.247  
This Part will address both the difficulties that expert 
psychologists face in determining whether a juvenile is irreparably 
corrupt from the scientific angle.248 Then, this Part will provide an 
overview of the practical difficulties states are having in 
determining how to apply the irreparable corruption standard.249 
1. Scientific Difficulties 
One of the primary difficulties mentioned in Roper is that the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA) forbids psychiatrists from 
diagnosing antisocial personality disorders in patients under 
                                                                                                     
 244. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (finding those 
whose crimes reflected transient immaturity protected from life without parole 
sentences). 
 245. See id. (interpreting Miller’s substantive holding as a requirement that 
sentencing courts limit life without parole sentences to those offenders whose 
crimes reflect irreparable corruption). 
 246. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the Court’s silence on Montgomery 
cases still coming to the Court). 
 247. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (“Even if a court considers a child’s 
age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates 
the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient 
immaturity.”). 
 248. Infra Part III.C.1. 
 249. Infra Part III.C.2. 
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eighteen.250 In Miller, the APA filed an amicus brief, in which they 
stated that “[t]he positive predictive power of juvenile 
psychotherapy assessments . . . remains poor.”251 
The difficulty preventing expert psychiatrists from using their 
clinical training to diagnose a juvenile with a personality disorder 
is the same that makes the death penalty and mandatory life 
without parole constitutionally impermissible: children’s brains 
are not yet fully developed. “Adolescence is a period of substantial 
brain maturation with respect to both structure and function.”252 
Furthermore, adolescence involves “plasticity in brain maturation” 
that is “qualitatively different from that of the adult.”253 The 
general takeaway, for those who argue for a categorical ban on 
juvenile life without parole sentences, is that because of the “rapid 
change in brain processes during adolescence, who [these children] 
will become as adults is not yet clear.”254 In other words, you cannot 
determine whether a juvenile offender committed a crime because 
of “transient immaturity” without seeing if he transitions out of 
that immaturity.255 From a psychological perspective, because of 
                                                                                                     
 250. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (“As we understand it, this difficulty underlies 
the rule forbidding psychiatrists from diagnosing any patient under 18 as having 
antisocial personality disorder, a disorder also referred to as psychopathy or 
sociopathy, and which is characterized by callousness, cynicism, and contempt for 
the feelings, rights, and suffering of others.” (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC 
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTICS AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
701– 06 (4th ed. text rev. 2000))). 
 251. Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric 
Association, and National Association of Social Workers as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 
10-9647), 2012 WL 174239, at *21. 
 252. Steinberg, supra note 42, at 70.  
 253. See Beatriz Luna & Catherine Wright, Adolescent Brain Development: 
Implications for the Juvenile Criminal Justice System, in APA HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHOLOGY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 91, 110 (Kirk Heilbrun ed., 2016)  
What neuroscience evidence can do is inform how adolescents 
constitute a special population with respect to culpability and extended 
sentencing. In regard to culpability, immaturities in the adolescent 
brain can provide evidence that the defendant may have acted in an 
impulsive and impassioned manner that might not have occurred had 
that individual reached full maturity with optimal executive control 
and dampened motivational reactivity. 
 254. Id. at 109. 
 255. See Robert Semel, Limitations of Extending Juvenile Psychopathy 
Research Assessment Tools and Methods to Forensic Settings, 4 J. PSYCHOL. & 
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the continued possibility for further brain development, a clinician 
cannot make a determination regarding whether a juvenile 
offender is in fact irreparably corrupt.256 This makes the states’ 
implementation of an irreparable corruption standard nearly 
impossible, as psychiatric diagnoses—the best evidence—are 
prohibited by the APA due to their unreliability. 
2. Procedural Difficulties in the States 
The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in a number of cases 
seeking guidance on the directives of Miller and Montgomery.257 
Without any further instruction, some states have taken steps 
legislatively to convert the sentences of those serving mandatory 
life without parole sentence into parole-eligible sentences.258 Other 
states have left the resentencing process largely up to their courts 
to figure out.259  
This considerable confusion has led to splits in the state courts 
related to three primary issues. The first area of confusion stems 
from the question of when the Miller/Montgomery protections are 
triggered. State courts are split as to whether to apply 
Miller/Montgomery to only mandatory sentencing schemes or to 
                                                                                                     
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 1, 1 (2015) (showing that “most individuals identified as 
psychopaths at age 13 will not receive such a diagnosis at age 24”). 
 256. Id.  
 257. See Johnson v. Idaho, 395 P.3d 1246 (Idaho 2017), cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 
470 (2017) (mem.) (denying without opinion petition for writ of certiorari urging 
categorical ban on life without parole sentences for juveniles); see also Adams v. 
Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 1796, 1799 – 1801 (2016) (mem.) (granted, vacated, and 
remanded) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (supplying that a life without parole 
sentence cannot be based simply on the serious or shocking nature of the offense); 
Tatum v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct. 11, 11–13 (2016) (mem.) (granted, vacated, and 
remanded) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (clarifying Miller/Montgomery as 
requiring a finding that the “crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility”). 
 258. See generally Associated Press, A State-by-State Look at Juvenile Life 
Without Parole, ASSOC. PRESS (July 31, 2017), 
https://apnews.com/9debc3bdc7034ad2a68e62911fba0d85 (last visited Dec. 2, 
2018) (presenting the number of inmates serving life without parole sentences, 
the number resentenced or released, and the legislative remedies of each state) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 259.  Id.; see also Kimberly Thomas, Random If Not Rare: The Eighth 
Amendment Weaknesses of Post-Miller Legislation, 68 S.C. L. REV. 393, 401–11 
(2017) (summarizing state responses to Miller). 
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extend the protections to those who received discretionary life 
without parole sentences.260 For example, the Arizona Supreme 
Court initially denied review on a case that applied Miller only to 
mandatory sentences.261 But after the Supreme Court vacated and 
remanded a number of Arizona cases for reconsideration in light of 
Montgomery,262 the court reversed course.263 The Virginia Supreme 
Court similarly had its decision finding Miller only applied to 
mandatory sentences vacated and remanded for reconsideration in 
light of Montgomery.264 However, that court remained steadfast 
that Miller/Montgomery only applied to mandatory life without 
parole sentences.265 An ancillary dispute among the courts exists 
over whether Miller/Montgomery protections apply to only “life 
without parole” sentences or more expansively to include de facto 
life without parole sentences—aggregated sentences that deny the 
prisoner any meaningful opportunity for release.266 
A second, and more applicable, disagreement exists over 
whether Montgomery even requires a finding of irreparable 
corruption.267 This dispute stems from the language of 
                                                                                                     
260.  For an appendix listing the various state court approaches to this 
question, see Alice Reichman Hoesterey, Confusion in Montgomery’s Wake: State 
Responses, the Mandates of Montgomery, and Why a Complete Categorical Ban 
on Life Without Parole for Juveniles is the Only Constitutional Option, 45 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 149,194 (2017). 
 261.  State v. Purcell, No. CA-CR 13-0614 PRPC, 2015 WL 2453192, at *1 
(Ariz. Ct. App. May 21, 2015), review denied (Ariz. Jan. 5, 2016), vacated, 137 S. 
Ct. 369 (2016) (mem.). 
 262. Tatum v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct. 11 (2016) (mem.). 
 263. See State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392, 396 (Ariz. 2016) (applying 
Montgomery to juvenile sentenced to life after the abolition of parole, who was not 
eligible for earned release credits, even where the legislature had later amended 
the statute to allow for the opportunity for release).  
 264. Jones v. Virginia, 136 S. Ct. 1358 (2016) (mem.). 
 265. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 795 S.E.2d 705, 713 (Va. 2017) (finding a 
juvenile’s statutorily prescribed life sentence in a state without parole was not 
mandatory because judges had the discretion to suspend any part of the sentence). 
 266. For a more comprehensive list of how state courts have decided this 
issue, see Hoesterey, supra note 260, at 195–97, App. D. 
 267. Compare Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265, 267 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding a 
finding of permanent incorrigibility/irreparable corruption is required); Davis v. 
State, 415 P.3d 666, 695 (Wyo. 2018) (same); People v. Holman, 91 N.E.3d 849, 
863 (Ill. 2017) (same); Landrum v. State, 192 So. 3d 459, 468 (Fla. 2016) (same); 
Veal v. State 784 S.E.2d 403, 410 (Ga. 2016) (same); Luna v. State, 387 P.3d 956, 
963 n.11 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016) (same); with United States v. Briones, 890 F.3d 
811, 819 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding no requirement that courts make an explicit 
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Montgomery, specifically the Court’s acknowledgment that “Miller 
did not require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a 
child’s incorrigibility.”268 Based on this sentence, some courts have 
construed Miller/Montgomery as merely requiring consideration of 
the factors of youth269 or reaffirming the need for proportionality 
review of sentences.270 However, as other courts have rightly 
pointed out, Montgomery also charges sentencing authorities with 
the duty of “separat[ing] those juveniles who may be sentenced to 
life without parole from those who may not.”271 Furthermore, recall 
that the central holding of Montgomery was that Miller created a 
substantive rule that the Eighth Amendment prohibited 
imposition of life without parole sentences on a class of 
offenders— those juvenile offenders whose crimes did not reflect 
irreparable corruption.272 The Court mentions eight times that 
only irreparably corrupt juveniles can receive life without parole 
sentences.273 While the split over this question highlights the 
degree of confusion caused by the Montgomery opinion, the case for 
the existence of the irreparable corruption is on safe ground. 
                                                                                                     
finding that juvenile offenders are irreparably corrupt); People v. Skinner 917 
N.W.2d 292, 308 (Mich. 2018) (same); Chandler v. State, 242 So. 3d 65, 69 (Miss. 
2018) (same); Johnson v. State, 395 P.3d 1246, 1258 (Idaho 2017) (same); State v. 
Valencia, 386 P.3d 392, 396 (Ariz. 2016) (same). 
 268. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2016). But see id.  
That this finding is not required, however, speaks only to the degree of 
procedure Miller mandated in order to implement its substantive 
guarantee. When a new substantive rule of constitutional law is 
established, this Court is careful to limit the scope of any attendant 
procedural requirement to avoid intruding more than necessary upon 
the States’ sovereign administration of their criminal justice systems. 
 269. See Chandler, 242 So. 3d at 69 (reaffirming its pre-Montgomery decision 
that Miller only required sentencing authorities to take into account 
characteristics and circumstances unique to juveniles) (citing Jones v. State, 122 
So. 3d 698, 702 (Miss. 2013)). 
 270. See Skinner, N.W.2d at 309–310 (“In this sense, the ‘irreparable 
corruption’ standard is analogous to the proportionality standard that applies to 
all criminal sentences.”). 
 271. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735; see also id. at 734 (“Miller, then, did more 
than require a sentence to consider a juvenile offender’s youth before imposing 
life without parole . . . .”). 
 272. Id. at 733–34. 
 273. See Hoesterey, supra note 260, at 173 n.189 (listing the eight separate 
sentences in the Montgomery opinion in which the Court highlights the 
importance of a finding of irreparable corruption). 
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Other courts have found application of the irreparable 
corruption standard unconstitutional.The Supreme Courts of 
Iowa, Massachusetts, and Washington all found that because 
distinguishing between the two cannot be done with accuracy or 
integrity, the imposition of life without parole sentences on 
juveniles would violate the states’ constitutions.274 In doing so, 
theses courts grappled with the same Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence and the scientific data on brain science development 
in adolescence presented to the Supreme Court in Miller and 
Montgomery and concluded the irreparably corrupt standard was 
unworkable.275 
The Iowa Supreme Court framed its review as determining 
whether to develop case law around this new irreparable 
corruption standard by proceeding on a case-by-case basis or 
taking a categorical approach, banning life without parole 
sentences under the state constitution.276 The court reviewed the 
case law development leading to Montgomery and concluded that 
identifying which juvenile offenders are “irretrievable” at the time 
of trial would be “too speculative and likely impossible given what 
we know about the timeline of brain development.”277 If “trained 
professionals with years of clinical experience would not attempt 
                                                                                                     
 274. See State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 838 (Iowa 2016) (“Because of the 
difficulty of applying the individual Miller factors, the likelihood that the 
multifactor test can be consistently applied by our district courts is doubtful at 
best.”); Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 283 – 85 
(Mass. 2013) (“Simply put, because the brain of a juvenile is not fully developed, 
either structurally or functionally, by the age of eighteen, a judge cannot find with 
confidence that a particular offender, at that point in time is irretrievably 
depraved.”); State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343, 354 (Wash. 2018) (“[G]iven the 
difficulty even expert psychologists have in determining whether a person is 
irreparably corrupt and the extremely high stakes of the decision . . . this type of 
discretion produces the unacceptable risk that children undeserving of a life 
without parole sentence will receive one.”). 
 275. See Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 811 (reviewing a psychologist testimony that 
because of Sweet’s adolescence it was not possible to determine if he would 
develop a “full-blown psychopathic personality disorder as an adult, and even if 
he did, psychologists could not say whether it would be untreatable”); Diatchenko, 
1 N.E.3d at 283–84 (“Given current scientific research on adolescent brain 
development, and the myriad significant ways that this development impacts a 
juvenile’s personality and behavior, a conclusive showing of traits such as an 
‘irretrievably depraved character’ can never be made with integrity . . . .”). 
 276. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 835–37. 
 277. Id. at 836–37. 
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to make such a determination,” the court found that “no structural 
or procedural approach, including provision of a 
death-penalty-type legal defense, [would] cure this fundamental 
problem.”278 
The court’s rejection was two-fold. First, the court found that 
the factors suggested by Miller for consideration such as the 
offender’s family and home environment, or history of abuse could 
cut either way in a sentencer’s determination.279 The ambiguous 
results and the known information about adolescent brain 
development convinced the court that it could not impose an 
irreparable corruption standard and hope for accurate or fair 
application.280 Second, any attempt to fairly determine who was 
the irreparably corrupt juvenile offender would require the use of 
death-penalty-type safeguards, such as expert testimony and 
extensive resources, and even as such the determinations would be 
constitutionally inadequate under the state constitution.281 
On the other side are the states that, upon review, have 
preserved juvenile life without parole sentences and attempted to 
craft procedural rules to ensure the constitutionality of the 
proceedings.282 Pennsylvania stands as a particularly poignant 
example of the struggle states have had crafting a procedure for 
determining which offenders meet the irreparable corruption 
standard. At the time of Miller, Pennsylvania had more juveniles 
                                                                                                     
 278. Id. at 837. 
 279. See id. at 838 (“Would the fact that the adolescent offender failed to 
benefit from a comparatively positive home environment suggest he or she is 
irreparable . . . or . . . suggest that his or her character and personality have not 
been irreparably damaged and prospects for rehabilitation are . . . greater?”). 
 280. See id. at 838 (“Because of the difficulty of applying the individual Miller 
factors, the likelihood that the multifactor test can be consistently applied by our 
district courts is doubtful at best.”). 
 281. See id. at 837  
In imposing a sanction akin to the death penalty in some respects, the 
trial court simply will not have adequate information and the risk of 
error is unacceptably high, even if we require an intensive, highly 
structured inquiry similar to that required by the ABA guidelines for 
the defense of death-penalty cases. 
 282. See State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 241 (Mo. 2013) (placing the burden on 
the state to make a showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 
irreparably corrupt); Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (fashioning 
rules for Pennsylvania, in lieu of state legislative action). 
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serving life without parole than any other state283 and is one of only 
three states with over one hundred juveniles yet to be 
resentenced.284 In Commonwealth v. Batts,285 the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania recognized a presumption against the imposition 
of life without parole for juvenile offenders and placed the burden 
on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender 
was incapable of rehabilitation.286 The court was asked to review 
the resentencing of a Montgomery prisoner, convicted and 
sentenced prior to Miller. The trial court considered a litany of 
information, including expert testimony, and found Batts to be 
irreparably corrupt and resentenced Batts to life without parole.287 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed that finding and set 
up the procedural framework for the other resentencings.288 
The Batts decision is especially intriguing because of its 
treatment of the Pennsylvania lower court’s consideration of 
expert testimony presented by the Commonwealth.289 Dr. Michals, 
a forensic psychiatrist testified that, based on his review of an 
examination and psychological testing conducted by the 
defendant’s expert, Batts’s personality would not change and that 
his impulsiveness, poor judgment, and “acting out behavior” were 
“just unfortunately part of who he is,” part of his “biological genetic 
                                                                                                     
 283. See JUVENILE SENTENCING PROJECT AT QUINNIPIAC UNIV. SCH. OF LAW & 
THE VITAL PROJECTS FUND, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES IN THE 
UNITED STATES, NOVEMBER 2017 SNAPSHOT, https://www.juvenilelwop.org/wp-
content/uploads/November%202017%20Snapshot%20of%20JLWOP%20Sentence
s%2011.20.17.pdf (noting that Pennsylvania had approximately 525 juveniles 
serving life without parole at the time of Miller while Michigan and Louisiana 
had 363 and 290, respectively).  
 284. See id. (noting that Pennsylvania has 325 mandatory resentencings 
remaining; prosecutors in Michigan and Louisiana have elected to pursue life 
without parole sentences in resentencing hearings for 229 and 112 inmates, 
respectively). 
 285. See Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 418 (Pa. 2017) (presenting 
the procedural history). 
 286. Id. 
 287. See id. at 426 (recounting the trial court’s finding that the aggravating 
factors significantly outweighed the mitigating factors). 
 288. See id. at 460 (reversing the trial court). 
 289. See id. at 438–39 (rejecting the psychiatrist’s testimony as directly in 
opposition to the legal conclusions of the Supreme Court and the science backing 
those conclusions). 
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makeup.”290 The expert did note that he could not predict the 
future and that Batts had not received any psychological treatment 
or counseling in prison, but he believed that people generally do 
not change as they age.291 Batts presented his own expert, who 
testified on the role Batts’s horrible environment played in 
creating his situation, and that he believed with therapy, Batts 
would be able to change.292 However, the trial court, in 
resentencing Batts to life without parole made reference to the 
defense experts’ belief that “any rehabilitation will require years 
of psychotherapy” as a grounds for finding Batts to be among the 
irreparably corrupt.293  
In overturning the lower court’s ruling, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania pointed out that the sentencing court had relied 
upon Dr. Michals’s testimony to decide that Batts was not capable 
of rehabilitation, but “the testimony and conclusions espoused by 
Dr. Michals are in direct opposition to the legal conclusion 
announced by the High Court and the facts (scientific studies) 
underlying it.”294 In part, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
reversed the sentencing court’s decision because the expert 
testimony was just plain wrong.295 However, the Supreme Court 
rejected Batts’s argument that expert testimony be required for a 
court to make a determination that the defendant is irreparable.296 
The court believed that placing a presumption against the sentence 
and requiring the prosecution to prove permanent incorrigibility 
beyond a reasonable doubt would likely necessitate expert 
                                                                                                     
 290. Id. at 422. 
 291. Id. at 425. 
 292. Id.  
 293. Id. 
 294. See id. at 438 (reminding the lower courts that when the U.S. Supreme 
Court issues a decision, they are bound not only by the result, “but also by those 
portions of the opinion necessary to that result”). 
 295. See id. at 438–39 (“Dr. Michals’ testimony therefore does not constitute 
competent evidence and cannot provide support for a conclusion that Batts’s 
actions were not the result of transient immaturity or that he is permanently 
incorrigible.”). 
 296. See id. at 455–56 (declining to hold that expert testimony is 
constitutionally required to rebut the presumption against permanent 
incorrigibility and leaving it to the sentencing courts to determine the necessity). 
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testimony and thus a constitutional requirement was 
unnecessary.297 
IV. The Link between Life Without Parole and Death Penalty 
Jurisprudence 
Prior to Graham, the Supreme Court often opined in the 
context of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that “death is 
different.”298 After Graham, at least one commentator has 
identified a new “kids are different” jurisprudence arising at the 
intersection of death penalty cases and juvenile life without parole 
cases.299 Professor Mary Berkheiser described the Court’s use in 
Graham of an analytical approach previously reserved for death 
penalty cases as “unceremoniously demolish[ing] the Hadrian’s 
Wall that has separated its ‘death is different’ jurisprudence from 
non-capital sentencing review from 1972.”300 Professor Berkheiser 
suggests that “[i]n its place the Court fortified an expansive ‘kids 
are different’ jurisprudence.”301 
For the first time in Graham the Court applied the legal 
reasoning that was previously reserved for death penalty cases to 
a case outside of the capital context.302 Recognizing that life 
without parole is “the second most severe penalty permitted by 
law,” the Court said that while death is “unique in its severity and 
irrevocability . . . life without parole sentences share some 
characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other 
sentences.”303 The Court, thus, linked capital punishment with life 
                                                                                                     
 297. See also id. at 460 – 61 (Wecht, J., concurring) (suggesting that expert 
testimony should be utilized by the State in almost all resentencings and that, 
where it is, the defendant should also be entitled to an expert in the interest of 
equity). 
 298. See Thomas, supra note 259, at 397. 
 299. See Berkheiser, supra note 157, at 1 (articulating the real impact of 
Graham as the sea change to the Court’s use of its Eighth Amendment legal 
reasoning).  
 300. Id.  
 301. Id.  
 302. See generally Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (addressing 
Graham’s case under an analytical framework previously saved for death penalty 
jurisprudence). 
 303. Id. at 69. 
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without parole sentences in their irrevocability: “The State does 
not execute the offender sentenced to life without parole, but the 
sentence alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable. 
It deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving 
hope of restoration.”304 For juvenile defendants, the Court 
reasoned, life without parole “means denial of hope; it means that 
good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it 
means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind 
and spirit of the convict, he will remain in prison for the rest of his 
days.”305 In effect, by reaching into its capital jurisprudence, the 
Court was opening a Pandora’s box — enabling litigants to use the 
Eighth Amendment to pursue limits on noncapital sentencing.306 
Before Graham, the Court had only ever used the Eighth 
Amendment to apply a categorical ban on sentences in capital 
cases, never in sentences of imprisonment.307 With Graham, 
Miller, and Montgomery, the Court definitively expanded the 
limitations on sentencing provided by the Eighth Amendment into 
the realm of juvenile life without parole sentences.308 While the 
Court has yet to push further in applying its Eighth Amendment 
limitations, it is clear, at least, that the Court wanted state courts 
to revisit their imposition of life without parole sentences on 
juvenile offenders. In order to interpret the Eighth Amendment 
procedural restriction on the state courts in Montgomery—the 
requirement that state courts find a juvenile offender irreparably 
corrupt before sentencing them to life without parole—it makes 
sense that we should look for guidance in the only area to which 
Eighth Amendment analysis had, until Graham, been 
applied— death penalty jurisprudence. 
                                                                                                     
 304. Id. at 69 – 70. 
 305. Id. at 72 (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989)). 
 306. See Russell & Denholtz, supra note 162, at 1124 (advocating for the use 
of Eighth Amendment challenges in noncapital sentencing contexts to push for 
better sentencing procedures for both juvenile and adult offenders). 
 307. See id. at 1125 (“In reviewing the constitutionality of noncapital 
sentences, the Court considered whether the sentence was ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ as applied to the offense and the offender.”). 
 308. See id. at 1125–26 (explaining the expansion of the death penalty 
framework to the juvenile life without parole context). 
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V. Applying the Lessons of Death Penalty Jurisprudence 
As in Montgomery, when the Supreme Court in Atkins v. 
Virginia309 drew an Eighth Amendment line mandating those with 
intellectual disabilities could not be executed, it left to the states 
how to implement this requirement.310 In Montgomery, the Court 
in effect told the states there was a class of offenders—juvenile 
offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of 
youth— who were constitutionally protected from the most severe 
available punishment—life without parole.311 In Atkins, the Court 
similarly told the states there was a class of offenders—the 
intellectually disabled—who were constitutionally protected from 
the most severe available punishment—death.312 In both Atkins 
and Montgomery, the Court, in an effort to avoid overstepping its 
federalism bounds, gave state courts and sentencers a clear order 
that certain offenders were exempt from certain punishments, but 
gave little substantive guidance as to how the sentencer should 
determine who fell into the protected categories.313  
Luckily, for state courts and sentencers baffled as to who is 
and is not “irreparably corrupt” the Supreme Court was forced in 
the years following Atkins to refine the boundaries of what states 
can and cannot do to determine which offenders are “intellectually 
disabled.”314 The guidance in these subsequent decisions can also 
                                                                                                     
 309. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 310. Id. at 317. 
 311. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (stating a 
different and more protective standard must apply to juveniles when considering 
a sentence of life without parole).  
 312. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that execution of the “mentally 
retarded” is excessive and violative of the Eighth Amendment).  
 313. Compare id. at 317 (“[W]e leave to the States the task of developing 
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction.”) (quoting Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416–17 (1986))), with Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735  
When a new substantive rule of constitutional law is established, this 
Court is careful to limit the scope of any attendant procedural 
requirement to avoid intruding more than necessary upon the State’s 
sovereign administration of their criminal justice systems. . . . [W]e 
leave to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce 
the constitutional restriction. 
 314. See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 707 (2014) (rejecting Florida’s scheme 
for determining intellectually disabled); Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052 – 53 
(2017) (rejecting Texas’s scheme for determining intellectually disabled). 
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provide guidance as to how state courts should determine the 
meaning of irreparable corruption and what kinds of evidence are 
persuasive, or perhaps even required, to make such a finding.  
A. Looking to the Atkins Line of Cases for Guidance on Defining 
an Amorphous Standard 
Daryl Atkins was sentenced to death for committing a 
robbery-murder with an accomplice.315 At sentencing, his defense 
relied upon the testimony of a forensic psychologist who testified 
that Atkins was “mildly mentally retarded.”316 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to revisit its prior decision in Penry v. 
Lynaugh317 holding that the Constitution did not bar the execution 
of intellectually disabled defendants.318 The Court undertook the 
familiar Eighth Amendment analysis and found that a national 
consensus had emerged against executing the intellectually 
disabled, as evidenced by the number of states that had taken 
legislative action to prohibit such sentences and the few executions 
being carried out in those states that maintained the penalty on 
the books.319 
The Court then turned to consider whether the penological 
purposes of the death penalty—retribution and deterrence—were 
served by executing the intellectually disabled.320 The Court 
concluded that intellectually disabled offenders’ diminished 
capacities “do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, 
but they do diminish their personal culpability.”321 As it would 
                                                                                                     
 315. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307. 
 316. Id. at 308 – 09. Atkins had an IQ of 59 and a mental age of a child between 
the age of nine and twelve-years-old. Id. While Atkins used the term mental 
retardation, the courts, and popular nomenclature, have since referred to 
intellectual disability. As used in this Note, the terms are interchangeable. 
 317. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 318. See id. at 340 (concluding that the Eighth Amendment does not bar the 
execution of “any mentally retarded person”). 
 319. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 (acknowledging the judgment of the 
legislatures and noting that the Court has no reason to disagree with that 
judgment). 
 320. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–19 (2002) (questioning whether 
any justification for the death penalty applies to “mentally retarded offenders”). 
 321. Id. at 318. 
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later state with regard to juveniles, the Court found this 
diminished culpability sufficient to undermine the retribution 
rationale because an offender with diminished culpability for their 
crime could not be considered among the worst of the worst for 
whom the most severe penalty was reserved.322 The Court pointed 
out that these same cognitive and behavioral impairments that 
lessened culpability also made these offenders less able to 
comprehend the possibility of death as a penalty and adjust their 
conduct accordingly.323 
The Atkins decision diverged from many of the Court’s 
previous Eighth Amendment reviews in that it bestowed on the 
states the power and obligation to define the class of defendants 
exempted from punishment by giving meaning to the term 
intellectually disabled.324 Past death penalty exemptions for 
classes of offenders were based on clear delineations such as age325 
or offense.326 The only exception until Atkins was Ford v. 
Wainwright,327 in which the Court, finding the Eighth Amendment 
barred the execution of the mentally insane, explicitly left it up to 
the states to determine a procedure for deciding whether a 
                                                                                                     
 322. See id. at 319 (concluding that the retribution rationale for the death 
penalty was not fulfilled by executing intellectually disabled offenders). 
 323. See id. at 320 (listing among these impairments: “the diminished ability 
to understand and process information, to learn from experience, to engage in 
logical reasoning, or to control impulses”). 
 324. See id. at 317 (“To the extent there is serious disagreement about the 
execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are 
in fact retarded. . . . [Thus] we leave to the States the task of developing 
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction . . . .”); but see Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416–17 (1986) (recognizing an already in-practice ban 
on executing the mentally insane and preserving the state’s rights to continue to 
determine the procedure for deciding whether a defendant was insane or not). 
 325. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (barring the death 
penalty for defendants under age sixteen at the time of the offense). 
 326. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420–21 (2008) (barring the 
death penalty for child rape); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) 
(barring the death penalty for accomplice without intent to kills in felony murder); 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (barring the death penalty for adult 
rape). 
 327. See generally Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (recognizing an 
already in-practice ban on executing the mentally insane and preserving the 
state’s rights to continue to determine the procedure for deciding whether a 
defendant was insane or not). 
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defendant met a mental insanity standard.328 Significantly, at the 
time of the Ford decision, no state actually allowed for the 
execution of the insane, so each state already had a procedure in 
place for its determination of whether a capital defendant belonged 
to this constitutionally protected class.329 The Court in Ford was 
not directing the states to develop wholecloth a new standard to 
define mental insanity, but rather recognizing that the states 
existent definitions would suffice.  
Atkins differed in that the constitutionally protected class it 
exempted did not have readily discernible members and the Court 
was telling the states to define intellectually disabled for 
themselves to determine who could and could not be executed.330 
By not establishing a bright-line rule, the Court delegated this task 
to the states with only the instruction that their standards would 
be constitutional so long as they “generally conformed” to the 
clinical definitions then in existence331—one set forth by the 
American Association on Intellectual and Development 
Disabilities (AAIDD)332 and a virtually identical definition 
provided by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in its 
Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-V). 
The clinical definitions looked to three distinct aspects of an 
individual’s deficits to make a determination of intellectual 
disability. First, the sentencer would look to the defendant’s 
“intellectual functioning deficits,” typically by using an IQ test.333 
                                                                                                     
 328. See id. at 416–17 (“[W]e leave to the State the task of developing 
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its execution of 
sentences.”). 
 329. See id. at 408 n.2 (reviewing the fifty states’ existent approaches to 
determining who constitutes an insane offender). 
 330. See id. at 317 (“Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be 
so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom 
there is a national consensus [regarding ineligibility for the death penalty].”). 
 331. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n. 22 (2002) (noting that the 
statutory definitions of mental retardation already in use by states who had 
banned the death penalty for intellectually disabled offenders were not identical 
but generally conform to the clinical definitions). 
 332. The AAIDD was formerly known, and cited to in Atkins, as the American 
Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR). 
 333. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 33 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. 
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A defendant would meet the intellectual functioning deficit prong 
by scoring “approximately two standard deviations or more below 
the population mean” with room for a standard margin of error—
an IQ in the range of 65–75.334 Second, the clinical definition looked 
to adaptive skill deficits.335 An impairment in any of three 
categories of adaptive deficits—conceptual, social, and 
practical— would be sufficient to meet the adaptive skills prong.336 
Clinicians based these determinations upon “knowledgeable 
informants . . . [and] educational, developmental, medical, and 
mental health evaluations.”337 Finally, the third prong required 
that a defendant’s intellectual and adaptive deficits manifested at 
some point before the age of eighteen.338 
However, as in Montgomery, the Court’s delegation to the 
states to determine the meaning of intellectual disability created 
confusion and wide variation in the resulting standards.339 By 
adopting clinical, rather than legal definitions, two problems arose. 
First, some states adopted additional requirements making the IQ 
requirements more restrictive (quantitative restrictions) or 
providing additional interpretive guidance for the adaptive prong 
(qualitative restrictions).340 Second, the clinical diagnoses did not 
match up well to criminal culpability.341 The result of both 
problems was underinclusive definitions of intellectual disability, 
leaving otherwise constitutionally protected individuals 
                                                                                                     
 334. Id.  
 335. See id. (requiring “deficits in adaptive function that result in a failure to 
meet developmental and socio-cultural standards for personal independence and 
social responsibility”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (including communication, 
self-care, and self-direction in this analysis). 
 336. Clinton M. Barker, Substantial Guidance without Substantive Guides: 
Resolving the Requirements of Moore v. Texas and Hall v. Florida, 70 VAND. L. 
REV. 1027, 1037 (2017). 
 337. DSM-5, supra note 333, at 33, 37.  
 338. See id. at 41 (setting the age-of-onset cutoff at eighteen to ensure the 
deficits occurred sometime during the developmental period). 
 339. See John H. Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical 
Definitions of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 689, 693 (2009) (“This troubling array allows a defendant who would be 
ineligible for execution in one state to be eligible for execution in another.”). 
 340. Barker, supra note 336, at 1037–38. 
 341. See id. (noting how the importation of clinical definitions into the legal 
realm assured continuing disagreement over the definition of intellectually 
disabled). 
2198 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2147 (2018) 
susceptible to capital punishment.342 In other words, those who 
would meet the “intellectually disabled” criteria in one state would 
be eligible for execution in another state simply based upon the 
state’s diverging approaches to applying the clinical definition.343 
States had to make a number of determinations in setting up 
a procedure for deciding which death row defendants were 
intellectually disabled or not.344 Should a judge or jury decide? Who 
would bear the burden of proof and what standard of proof would 
be required to show the defendant was intellectually disabled? 
According to Professor John Blume, these decisions contributed to 
the likelihood that an offender would be found to meet the 
definition of intellectually disabled.345 His research showed that 
from 2002 to 2014 where the jury was tasked with the 
determination, only 4% of defendants were found to be 
intellectually disabled compared to a 43% success rate for Atkins 
claims overall.346  
The success rates of Atkins claims varied significantly by 
state.347 For example, Alabama, a state which applied a strict IQ 
cutoff and assessed adaptive functioning deficits based on what the 
claimant could do, as opposed to (as the clinical definition required) 
focusing on the claimants limitations, rejected 88% of Atkins 
claims, whereas North Carolina, which did not apply such a 
restrictive definition of intellectual disability found 80% of 
claimants met the definition of intellectually disabled.348 Overall, 
Blume found that success rates were lower in states that had 
                                                                                                     
 342. Id. 
 343. See Blume et al., supra note 339, at 693 (“This troubling array allows a 
defendant who would be ineligible for execution in one state to be eligible for 
execution in another.”). 
 344. See John Blume et al., A Tale of Two (and Possibly Three) Atkins: 
Intellectual Disability and Capital Punishment Twelve Years after the Supreme 
Court’s Creation of a Categorical Bar, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 393, 410 (2014) 
(assessing the success rates of claims in jurisdictions adopting different 
procedures for Atkins hearings). 
 345. See id. (considering various factors and their effects upon Atkins claim 
success rates). 
 346. See id. at 410–11 (noting the added discrepancy that jurors are typically 
found to show greater leniency, especially in death penalty cases). 
 347. Id. 
 348. See id. at 412 (displaying disparities in successful Atkins claims by state). 
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substantively deviated from the clinical definitions mentioned in 
Atkins as the lodestar for determining intellectual disability.349 
Texas and Florida were two of the states that deviated the 
most from Atkins advice to follow the clinical definition.350 As a 
result, before 2014, Florida had not found any defendant met its 
definition of intellectually disabled, and Texas, with the largest 
number of Atkins claims at forty-five, had only found eight 
defendants to be intellectually disabled under that state’s rigorous 
standard.351 While most states post-Atkins adopted the clinical 
definitions outright, Texas and Florida used the room provided by 
the Supreme Court’s statement that it would leave to the states 
the creation of procedural rules to “enforce the constitutional 
restriction” to apply methods that were far more restrictive.352 By 
doing so, these states excluded from the constitutionally protected 
class persons whom no reasonable clinician would exclude from a 
pool of subjects with intellectual disability. 
In Florida, the courts applied a strict cutoff—if a defendant’s 
IQ was above 70, even if it was 71 or within the margin of error, 
then his claim would be dismissed without even considering his 
adaptive functioning deficits or age of onset, the second and third 
prongs of the clinical definition.353 The clinical definition referred 
to in Atkins recognized room for standard error, but the Florida 
courts would only go deeper into a defendant’s deficits if the IQ 
score fell at or below 70.354 The result was that a Florida defendant 
whose full scale IQ scores, providing a range rather than a 
snapshot, were between 68 and 86 could be executed, but a 
                                                                                                     
 349. See id. at 414 (“Florida and Alabama are in that category, as both of them 
(prior to Hall) adhered to an IQ cutoff. Texas also deviates greatly, having adopted 
its own idiosyncratic approach to adaptive functioning.”). 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. at 412–14. 
 352. Blume et al., supra note 339, at 691. 
 353. See Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 714 (Fla. 2007) (disqualifying a 
defendant with an IQ score of 72, even though it was within the standard error of 
measurement for qualifying under the IQ prong of Atkins). 
 354. Compare DSM-5, supra note 333, at 37 (finding an individual meets the 
intellectual prong of intellectual disability by scoring “approximately two 
standard deviations or more below the population mean, including a margin for 
measurement error,” or between 65 and 75), with Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 713 
(interpreting the statute defining intellectual disability as providing a threshold 
cutoff at 70). 
2200 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2147 (2018) 
California defendant with scores of 81 to 96 could not because the 
California courts adhered to the clinical definition and treated the 
Atkins prongs in totality.355  
Texas, on the other hand, imposed qualitative restrictions by 
adding additional interpretative guidance to how sentencers 
should understand the adaptive functioning prong.356 Texas added 
seven factors (the so-called Briseno factors) to the three-prong 
clinical test: (1) whether others thought the defendant was 
intellectually disabled, (2) whether the defendant formulated and 
carried through with plans, (3) whether the defendant’s conduct 
showed leadership, (4) whether the defendant’s conduct in 
response to external stimuli was rational, (5) whether the 
defendant could respond to questions coherently, (6) whether the 
defendant could hide facts and lie effectively, and (7) whether the 
crime required forethought or complex execution.357 By adding 
these questions, Texas directed the adaptive prong inquiry not to 
the defendant’s adaptive deficits, but to his strengths.358 So while 
the clinical definition recognized that a defendant could have 
certain adaptive strengths, for example he could lie effectively but 
still have intellectual disability,359 Texas would reject an Atkins 
claim so long as the defendant showed a strength in that one 
adaptive field.360 
Over a decade after Atkins, the Supreme Court finally weighed 
in on this underinclusiveness problem in states’ definitions of 
intellectual disability. In Hall v. Florida,361 the Supreme Court 
invalidated Florida’s use of the threshold IQ score, finding it 
                                                                                                     
 355. See Lois A. Weithorn, Conceptual Hurdles to the Application of Atkins v. 
Virginia, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1231 (2008) (“[A]s the comparison between 
Florida’s and California’s use of standardized IQ tests suggests, there are 
noteworthy inconsistencies in the ways in which state courts are using these 
tests.”). 
 356. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (describing 
the additional requirements). 
 357. Id. at 8–9. 
 358. Stephen Greenspan, The Briseno Factors, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND 
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 219, 219 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015). 
 359. DSM-5, supra note 333, at 33, 38. 
 360. Greenspan, supra note 358. 
 361. 572 U.S. 701 (2014). 
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inconsistent with Atkins.362 The Court emphasized that the clinical 
definitions were a “fundamental premise of Atkins.”363 In affirming 
its intention that the states abide by the clinical definition, the 
Court reminded the states that they do not have complete 
autonomy to define intellectual disability but rather should view 
Atkins as providing “substantial guidance on the definition of 
intellectual disability.”364 The Court seemed to warn the 
noncompliant states to adopt the clinical definition without edits, 
or risk being continually reversed. However, because of the 
federalism concerns inherent in the Eighth Amendment 
punishment questions, the Court couched its instructions in terms 
of “substantial guidance on the definition.”365 The Sixth Circuit has 
supported this interpretation, claiming that Hall instructs the 
courts that “[s]ociety relies upon medical and professional 
expertise to define and explain how to diagnose the mental 
condition at issue.”366 
The Court gave a similar directive in Moore v. Texas,367 
invalidating Texas’s use of the Briseno factors.368 “Not aligned with 
the medical community’s information, and drawing no strength 
from our precedent, the Briseno factors create an unacceptable risk 
that persons with intellectual disabilities will be executed.”369 
Drawing further upon the medical community, the Court chastised 
Texas’s many departures from clinical practice in requiring the 
defendant to show his adaptive deficits were not related to a 
                                                                                                     
 362. See id. at 719 (“The Atkins Court twice cited definitions of intellectual 
disability which, by their express terms, rejected a strict IQ test score cutoff at 
70.”). 
 363. Id. 
 364. See id. at 720 (“If the States were to have complete autonomy to define 
intellectual disability as they wished, the Court’s decision in Atkins could become 
a nullity, and the Eighth Amendment’s protection of human dignity would not 
become a reality.”). 
 365. Id. at 721; see also Van Tran v. Colson, 764 F.3d 594, 612 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(“In Hall, the Court reasoned that the Constitution requires the courts and 
legislatures to follow clinical practices in defining intellectual disability.”). 
 366. Van Tran, 764 F.3d at 612. 
 367. 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017). 
 368. See id. at 1044 (holding Texas’s scheme for determining intellectual 
disability impermissible restrictive). 
 369. Id. 
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personality disorder370 and in focusing on adaptive strengths 
rather than adaptive deficits.371 Repeating its refrain from Hall, 
the Court notes that the states have “some flexibility, but not 
unfettered discretion in enforcing Atkins’s holding.”372 However, 
the Court quickly supplied that the medical community’s current 
standards constrain the states’ flexibility here because they reflect 
the “best available description of how mental disorders are 
expressed and can be recognized by trained clinicians.”373 With the 
emphasis upon the medical community and the most current 
standards as a check upon the state’s control in determining the 
meaning of intellectual disability, the Court further hints at a 
requirement to bind close to the clinical experts because of a 
recognition that they know best in this particular field. 
B. Applying the Lessons of Atkins 
By expanding the modern Eighth Amendment analysis to the 
juvenile life without parole cases, the Supreme Court has arguably 
either broken wide open its “death is different” jurisprudence, or 
perhaps, more conservatively, has linked it together with a “kids 
are different” approach. Further, the Court’s treatment of juvenile 
offenders is inextricably linked to its treatment of intellectually 
disabled offenders in Atkins because they are both based on the 
lessened culpability from diminished capacity. Recognizing that 
link, how does the Court’s reentry into the discussion of how to 
define intellectually disabled offenders in Hall and Moore help 
lower courts struggling to define the similarly amorphous 
irreparable corruption standard? 
The Supreme Court in both the Atkins and Montgomery 
context is caught in the crossfire between respecting the states’ 
administration of their criminal justice systems and an 
                                                                                                     
 370. See id. at 1051 (“As mental health professionals recognize, however, 
many intellectually disabled people also have other mental or physical 
impairments.”). 
 371. See id. at 1050 (“But the medical community focuses the 
adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits.”). 
 372. Id. at 1053. 
 373. See id. (quoting DSM-5, at xli). 
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increasingly scientifically-based understanding of who the Eighth 
Amendment protects from society’s harshest punishments. 
In Atkins, the Supreme Court attempted to toe this line by 
leaving to the states “the task of developing appropriate ways to 
enforce the constitutional restriction,” while explicitly citing the 
clinical definition in its discussion of why an intellectually disabled 
offender has diminished personal culpability and is therefore 
constitutionally protected from execution.374 However, by not 
explicitly requiring states to look to the clinical definition, the 
Supreme Court opened the door to states like Texas and Florida to 
essentially nullify Atkins by warping the clinical definition 
through the addition of quantitative or qualitative restrictions to 
the point that the assessment of whether an individual defendant 
was intellectually disabled no longer bore out the clinical 
underpinnings.375 States were, thus, able to ignore what the 
leading psychiatrists and clinicians had to say in favor of their own 
restrictive ideas of what intellectual disability looked like.  
Most tellingly, Texas, in setting out its restrictive definition, 
explicitly pitted the clinical definition of intellectual disability 
against Lennie, a fictional intellectually disabled character in John 
Steinbeck’s Of Mice and Men.376 In adding its seven additional 
factors to the adaptive functioning prong,377—factors that would 
save the fictional Lennie but none of the men on Texas’s death row 
who met the clinical definition of intellectually disabled— Texas 
                                                                                                     
 374. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (referencing the clinical 
definitions intellectual and adaptive functioning prongs as they relate to 
diminished relative culpability). 
 375. See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 707 (2014) (rejecting Florida’s hard 
cut-off IQ); Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052–53 (rejecting the Briseno factors). 
 376. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W. 3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)  
Most Texas citizens might agree that Steinbeck’s Lennie should, by 
virtue of his lack of reasoning ability and adaptive skills, be 
exempt. . . . But does a consensus of Texas citizens agree that all 
persons who might legitimately qualify for assistance under the social 
services definition of mental retardation be exempt from an otherwise 
constitutional penalty? 
 377.  See id. at 8 (setting out additional qualitative factors to be considered in 
assessing adaptive deficits). 
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rejected the expertise of professional psychologists in favor of this 
“Lennie Standard.”378  
This danger of courts dismissing a scientific standard in favor 
of what they feel to be an appropriate definition threatens to play 
out in the Montgomery context. To avoid the development of a 
Lennie-like standard, courts should heed the lesson of Hall and 
Moore and adhere to the what the science tells us. In Hall and 
Moore, this meant an adherence to the clinical definition, but in 
the Montgomery cases we have no “clinical definition” of 
irreparable corruption. There are factors for the Court to 
consider,379 but no clinical definition per se. What the state courts 
have in lieu of a clinical definition, however, is an acknowledgment 
by the court that “it is difficult even for expert psychologists to 
differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile 
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”380  
It is bewildering that the Supreme Court would use as a 
standard for determining whether a juvenile can be punished to 
the harshest penalty available to them a distinction which it knew 
to confound even expert psychologists. Justice Scalia rails against 
this in his Montgomery dissent, accusing the majority of creating a 
de facto constitutional protection against life without parole for all 
juveniles because no court would be able to interpret the 
irreparable corruption standard.381 Applying the lessons of Atkins, 
it seems Scalia was right. Both the protection for intellectually 
disabled offenders and for juvenile offenders were fashioned out of 
a conception that these cannot be the worst of the worst because of 
                                                                                                     
 378. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Consider Legal Standard Drawn 
From ‘Of Mice and Men’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/us/politics/supreme-court-to-consider-legal-
standard-drawn-from-of-mice-and-men.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2018) (reporting 
that Texas’s brief in Moore urged the Supreme Court to let judges and juries 
decide the standard rather than medical professionals) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 379. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 475 – 76 (2012) (setting out the 
mitigating factors to be considered as “the mitigating qualities of youth”). 
 380. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). 
 381. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 744 (2016) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]his whole distortion of Miller[] is just a devious way of eliminating 
life without parole for juvenile offenders.”). 
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their diminished culpability.382 In both instances, that diminished 
culpability analysis is drawn from developments in psychology and 
neuroscience.383 If we apply the Supreme Court’s directive from 
Hall and Moore that courts need to adhere to the science, then the 
science behind juvenile brain development tells us that experts 
cannot make a determination as to whether a juvenile is 
irreparably corrupt because their brains are still developing.384 If 
the lower courts stick to the science when it comes to juveniles, as 
Hall and Moore suggest they should when it comes to the 
intellectually disabled, then there should be a requirement for 
expert testimony in Montgomery cases. To make a finding that a 
juvenile offender is irreparably corrupt, the courts should require 
prosecutors to present an expert who can testify that an individual 
offender is irreparably corrupt and allow the offenders to present 
expert testimony to rebut. The courts should require such 
evidence, even if finding credible experts for the prosecution is near 
impossible.385 This may be a confounding Catch-22, but it was one 
the Court was aware of when it got caught in the crossfire of 
federalism and reading adolescent brain science into the Eighth 
Amendment.386 
                                                                                                     
 382. Compare id. at 726 (clarifying Miller’s requirement that sentencers 
consider a child’s diminished culpability and capacity for change), with Atkins, 
536 U.S. at 318 (explaining how diminished culpability eliminates the retribution 
rationale for the death penalty).  
 383. Compare Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733 (drawing the connection to Roper 
and Graham’s rationale that children are different), with Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 
(“[T]here is abundant evidence that [intellectually disabled offenders] often act on 
impulse . . . and that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders.”). 
 384. See Luna & Wright, supra note 253, at 109 (finding that because of “rapid 
change in brain processes during adolescence, who [these children] will become 
as adults is not yet clear”). 
 385. See Brief for the American Psychological Association, American 
Psychiatric Association, and National Association of Social Workers as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 
10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 174239, at *21 (“The predictive power of juvenile 
psychotherapy assessments . . . remains poor.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (citing 
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antisocial personality disorder”).  
 386. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (“If trained psychiatrists with the advantage 
of clinical testing and observation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from 
assessing any juvenile under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we 
conclude that States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver 
condemnation . . . .”). 
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VI. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court’s juvenile life without parole cases were a 
reaction to the perceptible problem that the United States was 
sending too many people to prison for the rest of their lives for 
crimes committed as children. The growing numbers of juvenile 
lifers flew directly in the face of what developing brain research 
and psychology were showing: that kids really are different. The 
Court’s concern with the use of the harshest available penalties for 
those with diminished culpability had the right idea. But, 
unfortunately, in both Atkins and Montgomery, the Court’s 
apprehension of overstepping their bounds by interfering with the 
states’ administration of their criminal justice systems resulted in 
constitutional restrictions that required the states to try and 
define amorphous standards. Both the intellectual disability 
standard and the irreparable corruption standard draw from 
clinical psychology. Yet, by allowing states to define irreparable 
corruption, as they did intellectual disability, there is a real danger 
that the standard will be not be based on science. Rather, as the 
Lennie Standard reveals, they will be based on what the average 
Texan or Floridian thinks an irreparably corrupt child should be. 
The lesson of Atkins is to avoid this unmooring from the clinical 
definitions. The state courts should, thus, require expert testimony 
from the states and allow juvenile offenders the opportunity to 
present experts of their own when determining irreparable 
corruption. 
